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Stare decisis, the rule that judicial precedents should be followed, has been
considered by American courts to be more a rule of thumb than an iron-
fisted command. While stare decisis emphasizes the continuity of law as a
means to preserve public respect for judicial decisionmaking and to protect
the reliance interests of persons and institutions, these values must sometimes
yield to growth and change. Thus, an American court does not consider
itself "inexorably bound by its own precedents, but, in the interest of uni-
formity of treatment to litigants, and of stability and certainty in the law...
will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases unless
clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound
because of changed conditions and that more good than harm would come
by departing from precedent."'
Last Term, the Supreme Court confronted these issues in several impor-
tant cases of statutory interpretation.2 The most controversial of these was
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County.3 Paul Johnson
brought suit against the Transportation Agency for promoting an allegedly
less qualified female applicant to road dispatcher instead of him. Johnson
argued that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex, in violation of
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Farber, Philip Frickey, Willard Hurst, Earl Maltz, Gary Peller, Richard Posner, John Rich, and
Stephen Ross for comments on an earlier draft of this article. Craig Meredith and John Storella
provided useful research assistance.
1. Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the Law of the Case, 21 TEx. L.
REV. 514, 539-40 (1943). See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
150 (1960); Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1941).
2. See Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (overruling
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), but refusing to overrule Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), Ex Parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921), and cases relying on them); Puerto Rico v.
Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987) (overruling Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861));
United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987) (declining to overrule Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135 (1950), and applying it to bar suits by military personnel based on injuries received in the
course of military duty but caused by the negligence of civilians); see also Crawford Fitting Co. v.
J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2494,2498 (1987) (disapproving "classic obiter" in Farmer v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964)); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct.
2333, 2340-41 (1987) (disapproving reasoning of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), and refusing
to extend it, but not directly overruling precedent); NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
Local 340, 107 S. Ct. 2002, 2013 & n.15 (1987) (disavowing "dicta" in ABC v. Writers Guild, 437
U.S. 411 (1987)); North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 107 S. Ct.
336, 341 (1987) (rejecting "dicta" in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980)).
3. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
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title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 The Agency contended that the
applicant's sex could be considered pursuant to a voluntary affirmative action
plan, similar to the one the Court had upheld against title VII attack in
United Steelworkers v. Weber.5 The Court sustained the Agency's position,
relying on Weber. 6 Dissenting opinions by Justices White and Scalia argued
that the voluntary preference was not appropriate under existing precedents
and that, in any event, Weber should be overruled.7 The Court dismissed the
latter argument in a footnote," and concurring opinions by Justices Stevens
and O'Connor suggested that, whatever their doubts about the reasoning and
result in Weber, they felt compelled to follow and apply the precedent be-
cause it was an authoritative construction of the Civil Rights Act.9 Justice
Scalia responded that stare decisis concerns ought not save an opinion which
he believed to be so problematic, but only Justice White and Chief Justice
Rehnquist agreed.10
In light of the modern, balanced vision of stare decisis, it seems odd that
Justice Scalia's attack on Weber did not receive more attention from the
Court. What makes this even more remarkable is that the Court has been
increasingly willing to reexamine its precedents in constitutional cases.11
Why did the Court not apply the same liberal treatment to Weber? The an-
swer lies, in part, with the three-tiered hierarchy of stare decisis the Court
has created, at least in theory. Common law precedents enjoy a strong pre-
sumption of correctness. The Court applies a relaxed, or weaker, form of
that presumption when it reconsiders its constitutional precedents, because
the difficulty of amending the Constitution makes the Court the only effective
resort for changing obsolete constitutional doctrine. Statutory precedents, on
the other hand, often enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness. In
some cases, the Court says it will overrule statutory precedents only under
the most compelling circumstances, such as new constitutional develop-
ments. According to many judges and commentators, this heightened adher-
4. Id at 1446; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 86-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982)).
5. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
6. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1457.
7. Id at 1465 (White, J., dissenting); id at 1474 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
8. Id at 1450 n.7.
9. Id at 1460 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 1465 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
10. Id at 1465 (White, J., dissenting); id at 1473 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
11. See Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 151,
152-55 (1958) (Court overruled prior precedents at least 90 times between 1810 and 1957, 60 of
which involved constitutional precedents); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. RaV. 735, 743
(1949) (Court overruled constitutional precedents 21 times between 1937 and 1949); Maltz, Some
Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. Rav. 467, 467 (Court
overruled constitutional precedents 47 times between 1959 and 1979); see also Noland, Stare Decisis
and the Overruling of Constitutional Decisions in the Warren Years, 4 VAL. U.L. Rv. 101, 112-31
(1969) (survey of precedents overruled by Warren Court and rationales on which Court relied).
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ence to stare decisis "marks an essential difference between statutory
interpretation on the one hand and [common] law and constitutional inter-
pretation on the other." 12 The purpose of this article is to examine critically
and historically this super-strong presumption against overruling statutory
precedents.
Part I traces the history of the super-strong presumption but raises a puz-
zle. Notwithstanding the rule, the Supreme Court has overruled or materi-
ally modified statutory precedents more than eighty times since 1961. The
super-strong presumption is not just rhetoric, though, for the Court normally
does not completely admit what it is doing, or goes to great length to explain
its overruling of statutory precedents by reference to three exceptions which
are arguably consistent with the primary theory underlying the super-strong
presumption. Although I find the Court's exceptions incompletely persua-
sive, they do suggest that the super-strong presumption is not a blanket rule.
A given statutory precedent is particularly vulnerable to modification or
overruling if the Court's original discussion of the issues is procedurally un-
satisfactory, if the statute being interpreted is generally worded and has not
been the subject of extensive legislative tinkering, and/or if subsequent legis-
lative developments have undercut the rationale of the decision and private
parties have not extensively relied on it.
Part II argues that the Court should abandon the super-strong presump-
tion against overruling statutory precedents and should adopt an "evolutive"
approach, suggested by the Court's opinions overruling common law prece-
dents, as well as some of the Court's earlier opinions overruling statutory
precedents. Under the Court's approach in these cases, a statutory precedent
should enjoy a strong presumption of validity and should not be overruled
12. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 540 (1948), quoted in
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 106 S. Ct. 1922, 1930 n.34 (1986); see R. KEETON,
VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 79-80 (1967) ("Can and should the court overrule its earlier [statu-
tory] interpretational decision, subject only to the same limitations it would apply in overruling one
of its common law decisions? Not so, say many courts and writers."); F. NEWMAN & S. SURREY,
LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 653 (1955) (judges often express special reluctance to over-
rule statutory precedents); Rogers, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball
and the Antitrust Laws, 14 HOUSTON L. REv. 611, 626 (1977) ("prevailing view" is that stare
decisis should be followed more strictly when statutory interpretation is implicated than when
"courts are faced with common law or [other] court-made precedents"); see also R. DICKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 252-55 (1975) (criticizing super-strong
presumption against overruling statutory precedents); Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judi-
cial Decisions (forthcoming in Cornell Law Review) (criticizing three-pronged hierarchy of stare
decisis); Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEX. L. Rnv. 247 (1947)
(defending super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents); Maltz, The Nature of
Precedent, 66 N.C.L. RPv. 367, 388-89 (1988) (criticizing reasons underlying Court's distinction
between statutory precedents and common law or constitutional precedents); Note, The Power That
Shall Be Vested in a Precedent Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L.
REv. 345, 370 (1986) (defending presumption of validity in statutory but not constitutional cases).
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simply because later Justices disagree with it. The normal strong presump-
tion, however, may be rebutted by changed circumstances which render the
statutory precedent not only inconsistent with original legislative expecta-
tions and evolving statutory policy, but indeed counterproductive to current
policy. If the original reasons for the rule have disappeared or weakened, the
rule has been persuasively criticized by judges and commentators, and practi-
cal experience suggests that the statutory goals are being undermined by the
existing rule and can be better served by a new rule, the precedent should be
overruled unless there has been substantial legislative or private reliance on
the rule. Part II concludes with a rebuttal to the arguments that have been
used to justify an unusually strict presumption of correctness for statutory
precedents. In this article I do not question the relaxed presumption of cor-
rectness for constitutional precedents, 13 nor do I reexamine the rule and pol-
icy of stare decisis generally. 14
The evolutive approach is explicated in greater detail through specific ex-
amples in part III, beginning with Johnson. Although Justice Scalia's argu-
ments against Weber are astute and not without power, they do not justify
overruling the precedent, for rather conventional stare decisis reasons. There
are a number of cases, however, in which the super-strong presumption
seems to have saved precedents which ought to have been overruled under an
evolutive approach. Several such cases are noted in part II, and I examine
another in some detail in part III. Part III concludes with a line of cases that
has recently culminated in an overruling of statutory precedent and that pro-
vides a good example of the evolutive approach proposed in this article.
I. OVERRULING STATUTORY PRECEDENTS: SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
AND DOCTRINE
New to the Court, Justice Scalia may have been (understandably) taken
aback by the Court's dismissive attitude toward his reasoned arguments in
Johnson. Indeed, the super-strong presumption against overruling statutory
precedents is a very odd doctrine, if it can even be called that. Its exact
origins are something of a mystery, its precedential support is shaky, and its
uneven development and application have spawned a dizzying array of
exceptions.
The Supreme Court in the nineteenth century occasionally suggested a hi-
erarchy in which constitutional precedents would be treated with less defer-
13. Easterbrook, supra note 12, and Maltz, supra note 12, argue that constitutional precedents
should not be so easy to overrule. The author of the note cited supra note 12 argues for virtual
abandonment of stare decisis limitations for constitutional precedents.
14. For a recent exposition, see Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987), and see also
PRECEDENT IN LAW (L. Goldstein ed. 1986).
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ence than statutory precedents, 15 but not until the twentieth century did this
suggestion mature into widely cited doctrine. In his celebrated dissenting
opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 16 Justice Louis Brandeis de-
fended relaxed stare decisis for constitutional precedents. Although "in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right," Justice Brandeis observed that "in cases involving
the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is prac-
tically impossible, this Court has often overruled its prior decisions." 17
Although he did not distinguish between common law and statutory prece-
dents in his Burnet dissent, Justice Brandeis was notably reluctant to disturb
statutory precedents, as his even more celebrated opinion for the Court in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins' suggests. Erie, of course, overruled Swift v. Ty-
son,' 9 which had interpreted the Rules of Decision Act20 to permit federal
courts to create general federal common law in diversity cases. Justice Bran-
deis noted, first, that new scholarship had argued that Swift's reading of the
Act was historically questionable2 1 and, second, that mischievous and unex-
pected policy consequences had resulted from Swift's reading of the Act. 22
Albeit fully persuaded of the precedent's error, Justice Brandeis stated that
this alone did not justify overruling Swift. "If only a question of statutory
construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine
so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality
of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so."123
Thus, Burnet stands for the proposition that constitutional precedents may
be overruled more easily than either statutory or common law precedents.
Erie can be read to support the proposition that established statutory prece-
15. Chief Justice Taney suggested that when a precedent involves "vested rights" of contracts
and property it may not be overruled, whereas "the construction of the Constitution is always open
to discussion when it is supposed to be founded in error." Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,
470 (1849); see The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 471, 487 (1851) (in cases involving contracts
and property rights, stare decisis must be respected to avoid harming those who have relied on
precedent); cf Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677 (1880) (state court reversals of Supreme
Court interpretations of state law should only be given prospective effect so that those who have
relied on the original decision are not harmed).
16. 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 406-07 & 407 n.2 (citing cases).
18. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
20. Chapter 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982)).
21. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73.
22. Id. at 74-77.
23. Id. at 77-78. Oddly, Justice Brandeis failed to make perfectly clear how Swift was unconsti-
tutional. Probably, the argument is that nothing in article III suggests that the grant of diversity
jurisdiction was intended to authorize federal courts to create substantive rules of decision in diver-
sity cases, nor does article I or article III give that power to Congress. See Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 392-98 (1964) (analyzing
Justice Brandeis' rationale for overruling Swift).
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dents may be overruled only under the most compelling circumstances, as
when there are constitutional doubts about the statute as interpreted. Pre-
sumably, common law precedents would continue to enjoy the normal stare
decisis presumption. The Court pursued these suggestions in the oeuvre of
Justice Brandeis and in the 1940s and thereafter formally relied on the super-
strong presumption to protect vulnerable statutory precedents in a number of
cases.24 In the process, several different rationales were set forth for the
super-strong presumption. Generally, the rationales appealed to the emerg-
ing legal process concept that it is inappropriate for courts to create new
legal rules when the legislature is more institutionally competent to act.
Thus, the Court suggested that a longstanding interpretation of a statute
became "part of the warp and woof of the legislation," which only Congress
itself could change.25 In 1947, Professor Frank Horack expanded upon this
argument and articulated it in separation of powers terms: After a judicial
decision, "the statute to that extent becomes more determinate, or, if you
will, amended to the extent of the Court's decision.... Thus, if the Court in
a second case changes its former interpretation the functional consequences
of the change are legislative rather than judicial."'26 Though this argument
sounds excessively mechanical, it has been accepted by a broad range of Jus-
tices in the last twenty-five years.27
A related, but more functional, justification for the super-strong presump-
tion is based upon legislative acquiescence. Chief Justice Harlan Stone was
the most prominent exponent of this argument in the 1940s. He argued that
if Congress does not amend the statute to overrule the statutory precedent,
and especially if it reenacts the statute without changing the operative lan-
24. For some early examples of special stare decisis protection for statutory precedents, see Tool-
son v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953) (per curiam) (reaffirming Federal
Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)); United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 333
U.S. 771 (1948) (refusing to overrule United States v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 298 U.S. 492 (1936));
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946) (reaffirming Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470 (1917)); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-13 (1945) (plurality opinion) (reaffirming
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943) (refusing
to overrule Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)); see also Commissioner v. Estate of Church,
335 U.S. 632, 690 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (listing cases from previous decade in which
reenactment of statute reinforced earlier judicial decision).
25. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948). This argument had underpinnings in
the vested rights cases of the nineteenth century. "After a statute has been settled by judicial con-
struction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights acquired under it are concerned, as
much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is to all intents and purposes
the same in its effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment."
Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1880).
26. Horack, supra note 12, at 250-51 (emphasis in original).
27. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 257-58 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting); United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co. 381 U.S. 392, 406 (1965) (Doug-
las, L, dissenting) (same).
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guage, it is presumed that Congress "approves" of the interpretation.28 Such
tacit congressional approval allegedly raises the normal presumption of a
precedent's correctness to the super-strong presumption for most statutory
precedents. This argument has proved to be particularly robust in the 1970s
and 1980s, and it was the majority opinion's main response to Justice Scalia
in Johnson. 29
Both the statutory amendment and the congressional acquiesence argu-
ments rest in part on a third argument, based upon practical reliance. Once a
statute is authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court, the argument
goes, private parties will arrange their conduct to take account of the Court's
interpretation-that is what makes the Court's interpretation effectively "leg-
islative."' 30 Similarly, it may be presumed that Congress itself relies upon the
interpretation when it again focuses attention on the statute and reenacts or
amends it; failure to overrule the Court's interpretation signals legislative
approval.31 A highly sophisticated form of the reliance argument was devel-
oped in Dean Edward Levi's influential article on legal reasoning published
in 1948.32 Dean Levi started with the proposition that each interpretation of
a statute is like a keystone on which private conduct, future interpretations,
and even legislative activity will presumptively build. Overruling an inter-
pretation of the statute, therefore, will unsettle a vast cluster of public and
private expectations. Hence, Dean Levi argued, statutory precedents should
not be overruled unless they are unconstitutional. 33
The Court itself has never formally and thoroughly examined the argu-
28. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1940) (Stone, J.) (declining to alter appli-
cation of Sherman Act to labor unions, since Congress was aware of controversy and did not legis-
late on the matter); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70-76 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(under Apex Hosiery rule, where statutory interpretation is publicized, failure of Congress to over-
rule it creates presumption of legislative approval); see James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 230-35
(1961) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing in support of reaffirming
Comissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), which held embezzled money not taxable income,
since Congress chose not to enact contrary legislation in following 15 years); Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam) (legislative acquiescence in precedent); Helver-
ing v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 130-32 (1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (congressional reenactment of
statute Court has interpreted creates presumption of legislative approval of Court's interpretation).
29. 107 S. Ct. at 1450-51 n.7.
30. See Horack, supra note 12, at 251 ("The correctness or incorrectness of the prior rule is less
important than the fact that the members of society have acted upon it."); see also Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 403 (1943) (because government and taxpayers rely on tax precedents "a
long period of accommodations to an older decision sometimes requires us to adhere to an unsatis-
factory rule").
31. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) ("The long time failure of Con-
gress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed, and the enactment by Congress of
legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction as effective, is persuasive of legisla-
tive recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one.").
32. Levi, supra note 12.
33. Id at 523-40.
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ments recounted above and has not established the super-strong presumption
as settled doctrine. Instead, the Court or individual Justices rhetorically in-
voke strict stare decisis for statutory precedents from time to time, typically
with a citation to Burnet,34 which by itself does not really support a super-
strong presumption for statutory (as opposed to common law) precedents. In
addition, the doctrine is often abridged. Three appendices to this article35 list
cases in which the Court has explicitly or practically overruled important
reasoning in its statutory precedents, from the 1961 Term through the 1986
Term of the Court. There have been more than eighty such overrulings in
this period, a rather surprising number given the rhetoric. In only a small
minority of those cases was a constitutional issue lurking in the background.
The existence of so many decisions materially modifying or rejecting prior
holdings in statutory precedents raises the question whether the Court really
takes the super-strong presumption seriously.
I believe that it does. To begin with, in only twenty-six instances (or one
per Term) has the Court explicitly repudiated both the reasoning and the
result of a statutory precedent. In the remainder of the cases, the Court only
implicitly overruled the statutory precedent, or overruled important reason-
ing in the precedent and not the result. Indeed, in a significant number of
cases the Court has refused seriously to consider overruling or narrowing
statutory precedents that might have been vulnerable had they been common
law or constitutional precedents. 36
34. Cases citing Burnet include Commissioner v. Fink, 107 S. Ct. 2729, 2737-38 & n.6 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Oldahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 n.5 (1985) (opinion of
Rehnquist, J.); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 715-16 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 175 n.12 (1976), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974). Edelman and Illinois
Brick, each of which merely repeat the Burnet quotation, are themselves leading cites for the super-
strong presumption.
35. The three appendices include decisions in which the Supreme Court: (1) expressly stated it
was overruling a statutory precedent (appendix A); (2) implicitly overruled a statutory precedent
(appendix B); and (3) expressly disapproved important reasoning in statutory precedents, which the
Court characterized as dicta (appendix C. I have not included cases in which the Court "qualified"
or "reinterpreted" a statutory precedent, unless it was a pretext for implicitly overruling it.
Although such decisions certainly indicate erosion of the precedent's authority, they should not be
counted unless the Court is practically replacing its reasoning with a new interpretation of the
statute. See Blaustein & Field, supra note 11, at 152-59 (similar but more conservative approach
used for listing decisions overruling constitutional precedents).
36. In addition to cases discussed in detail later in this article, see United States v. Johnson, 107
S. Ct. 2063 (1987) (reaffirming and expanding upon Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950),
even though Court has repudiated most of precedent's reasoning and interpretation is at odds with
statutory text); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61 (1985) (reaffirming Na-
tional Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), and later cases, which held contrac-
tual work preservation rules valid under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as long as not
oriented primarily to secondary objectives); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 723 n.23 (1982) (refusing to overrule Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1972), which prohibited federal court injunctions against work stop-
1368
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When the Court does admit that it is overruling a statutory precedent, it
often claims that the case fits one of the three main exceptions to the super-
strong presumption which have been posited by various Justices in the last
thirty years. This proliferation of exceptions demonstrates that the Court is
willing to go beyond the Brandeis-Levi exception for statutory precedents
overtaken by mounting constitutional problems, but it is unclear how far
these "escape hatches" dilute the super-strong presumption. While no one of
the exceptions satisfactorily predicts when the Court is likely to reconsider
statutory precedents, a rough descriptive paradigm of what the Court does
can be created out of the three exceptions. The willingness of the Supreme
Court to reconsider statutory precedents depends upon: (1) the thorough-
ness of the Court's consideration of the issue in the precedent; (2) the degree
to which Congress has left development of the statutory scheme to the
courts; and (3) the degree to which the precedent has generated public and
private reliance. The remainder of this part analyzes these three exceptions.
A. THE PROCEDURALIST EXCEPTION
Unlike Justice Brandeis, Justice Felix Frankfurter was more than willing
to reconsider statutory precedents even when no constitutional issue was
posed.37 But he was also sensitive to traditional stare decisis concerns for
pages pending arbitration unless underlying dispute capable of arbitration under collective bargain-
ing agreement); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-12 (1982) (reaffirming cases holding
exhaustion of administrative remedies not necessary under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Busic v. United
States, 446 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1980) (relying on Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978), to hold
that 18 U.S.C. § 924, which authorizes enhancement of sentence for carrying firearm, cannot be
applied to persons convicted under statutes which already authorize such enhancement); Quem v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979) (refusing to overrule Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677
(1974), which held that suits for damages against states cannot be maintained under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, because Congress did not intend that section to be exception to eleventh amendment immu-
nity); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (relying on Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), which held that antitrust defendant could not
defend against direct purchaser by showing that direct purchaser passed on excess costs to indirect
purchaser, to hold that indirect purchaser can not use pass-on theory offensively to recover from
defendant); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-175 & n.12 (1976) (reaffirming Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 reaches private discrimina-
tion, and expanding this principle to § 1981); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 133-35 (1972)
(in tax case, citing lower court precedent decided under old statutory law because, even though
these cases not controlling, taxpayers who relied on them would be harmed by judicial modification
without notice); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 797-802 (1972) (refusing to overrule Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which construed the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b), 2671-2680, to prohibit claims against the government based on strict or absolute liability
for ultrahazardous activities, in large part because Congress reviewed the Federal Tort Claims Act
and did not change it); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969) (following 150-year-old judi-
cial practice of refusing to allow aggregation of amounts of claims to meet requirement of federal
jurisdiction because Congress had consistently reenacted statutory language in face of settled judi-
cial interpretation).
37. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202, 220-23 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For earlier
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continuity in the law and the public and private reliance on the Court's direc-
tions, and he was aware that Congress itself sometimes relied on the Court's
statutory precedents. 38 Justice Frankfurter's opinions suggest a significant
exception to the super-strong presumption when the statutory precedent is
procedurally flawed due to poor briefing or inadequate deliberation by the
Court. "[T]he relevant demands of stare decisis do not preclude considering
for the first time thoroughly and in the light of the best available evidence of
congressional purpose, a statutory interpretation which started as an unex-
amined assumption on the basis of inapplicable citations and has the claim of
a dogma solely through reiteration. ' 39 This "proceduralist exception" to the
super-strong presumption is very appealing, because it posits that what the
Court is overruling is not a "true" precedent, in that it does not reflect ra-
tional consideration and deliberation by the Court. If the earlier decision is
not a true precedent, it is not part of the warp and the woof of the law, and
the Court is not abridging reasonable private or legislative expectations in
overruling the decision. The proceduralist exception thus mirrors the legal
process rationales for the super-strong presumption.
Justice Frankfurter's proceduralist exception has been the most frequently
invoked explanation when the Court has overruled its statutory precedents.
There are at least three different situations in which such proceduralist the-
ory has been invoked. These instances are of great interest, both because the
Court uses proceduralist rhetoric as a way around the super-strong presump-
tion against overruling statutory precedents, and because the Court often
strains the procedural history of the precedent to invoke the exception.
First, the Court will often overrule or disapprove of dicta-statements in
statutory precedents which are not necessary to the decision of the case and
therefore not thoroughly briefed or considered by the Court. Indeed, it has
become almost a routine occurrence for the Court in recent years to "clean
up" stray dicta (much of it probably penned by wayward law clerks) in later
decisions.40 This is troubling in several respects. Statements in Supreme
expressions of Justice Frankfurter's views, see Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 140-
41 (1941) (refusing to view congressional silence as acceptance of ill-reasoned precedents); Helver-
ing v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (stare decisis "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence
involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and veri-
fied by experience").
38. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 676-87 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 220-21 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40. For a few recent examples, see Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2494,
2498 (1987) (refusing to rely on dictum from Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964),
which dealt with exercise of district judges' discretion to tax costs); Local 82, Furniture & Piano
Moving Drivers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 549-50 & n.22 (1984) (rejecting dictum from Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), which related to union elections governed by 29 U.S.C. § 482);
Zipes v. TWA, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 & n.12 (1982) (correcting dictum in earlier cases that referred
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Court opinions later declared to be dicta are often quite reasonably treated as
authoritative by lower courts, private parties, and Congress. By characteriz-
ing earlier statements as dicta, the Court seems at times almost too willing to
shift directions frequently; this is not only at odds with the super-strong pre-
sumption, but also with the goal of orderly development of the law underly-
ing normal stare decisis. The Court sometimes seems to use this rationale as
a backhanded method to narrow precedents a majority does not like.
An example of this phenomenon is the Court's odd vacillation concerning
the reach of state action immunity, to the antitrust laws created by Parker v.
Brown.41 After years of experience with the immunity, the Court in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co.42 found Parker inapplicable in most cases in which the
antitrust defendants are private parties, rather than state actors.43 Although
there was no majority opinion on this issue, five Justices explicitly narrowed
Parker, but without overruling it (the defendents in Parker were state ac-
tors).44 Hence, the Justices proclaimed themselves faithful to stare decisis
concerns, because they were at most disavowing dictum. Yet that is debata-
ble. As outraged concurring and dissenting opinions demonstrated, Parker
had held that the antitrust laws were not meant to compromise the state's
power to create regulatory programs.45 This holding becomes almost non-
sensical if private actors regulated by the state can be sued, even if state
actors cannot.
The Cantor approach to stare decisis strikes me as disingenuous and guar-
anteed to produce confusion in the lower courts. It was also unsuccessful.
In yet another volte-face, the Court has hastily, albeit stealthily, retreated
from Cantor. A unanimous Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers Associ-
ation v. Midcal Aluminum, Ina 46 denied antitrust immunity for a state pro-
gram requiring wine producers to establish resale price schedules, a result
consistent with Cantor; but the Court, in contrast to Cantor, focused on the
to timely filing as jurisdictional requirement, rather than matter akin to statute of limitations); City
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 168 (1980) (correcting dictum in United States v. Board of
Comm'rs of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U.S. 110 (1978), which suggested that "state" in Voting Rights Act
of 1965 included cities). See generally appendix C (listing decisions overruling important dicta in
statutory precedents).
41. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
42. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
43. The plurality opinion in Cantor found Parker inapplicable to cases in which the defendant is
a private party. IaM at 585-92 (opinion of Stevens, J., with Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.). A fifth
Justice applied a balancing test to determine whether private parties are entitled to Parker immu-
nity. Id. at 609-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
44. Id. at 585-92 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (analyzing Parker); see id. at 613 n.5 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing for narrowing Parker).
45. IM. at 603-05 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment and concurring in part); id. at 614-17
& n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
46. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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degree of state regulation, not on the nature of the parties. 47 Some lower
courts continued to follow Cantor, however-until Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,48 in which the Court used a Midcal
analysis, focusing on the degree of state regulation, to conclude that the pri-
vate defendants subject to state regulation were entitled to antitrust immu-
nity. The effect of the Court's decision is to overrule the reasoning in Cantor,
which is at odds with the super-strong presumption. Southern Motor Carriers
simply avoided that problem by substantially ignoring Cantor and only dis-
approving of "questionable dicta."' 49 The Court's vacillation from Cantor to
Southern Motor Carriers shows how the proceduralist exception can conceal
substantial shifts in the Court's approach to statutes.
Southern Motor Carriers illustrates a second situation in which Justice
Frankfurter's proceduralist exception is applicable. The Court may overrule
a statutory precedent which is inconsistent with other statutory precedents,
particularly if the former also seems to reflect a lack of careful briefing and
consideration by the Court. Like the exception for dicta, the exception for
inconsistent precedents is plausible enough but can be manipulated to mask
the Court's reevaluation of statutory policy. Also, once one realizes that the
Court's interpretations of a statute will often run in several different direc-
tions, this exception suggests the difficulty of realizing the goals of the super-
strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents.50
An example of this phenomenon is the Court's interpretation of title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.51 Title VI states that no person shall, "on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 52 Judging the legal-
ity of educational practices that allegedly deprived non-English speaking
Chinese children of an equal education, Lau v. Nichols53 interpreted title VI
to prohibit policies having a discriminatory effect on participants in federally
assisted education.5 4 Four years later, Regents of the University of California
47. Id. at 102-06.
48. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
49. Id at 57 n.21.
50. Easterbrook, supra note 12, argues that stare decisis should not be rigidly applied, in part
because institutions making choices by majority vote will generate logically inconsistent results over
time unless later expressions of the voters' will are given priority. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticiz-
ing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982) (arguing that some inconsistency in the Supreme
Court's decisions is both inevitable and desirable). When precedents clash, adherence to stare deci-
sis often requires that one be overruled.
51. Pub L. No. 81-352, § 60, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to
2000d-6 (1982)).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
53. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
54. Five Justices joined the opinion for the Court, which found administrative regulations bar-
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v. Bakke 5 interpreted title VI to prohibit only practices that violate the four-
teenth amendment,56 i.e., intentional discrimination.
Five years after that, in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commis-
sion,5 7 the Court had to decide whether employment tests having a disparate
impact on Hispanic applicants for positions with the New York City Police
Department could violate title VI, in the absence of a showing of intentional
discrimination. The Court split three ways on the issue, with each group of
Justices relying on stare decisis! Four Justices would have overruled Lau
entirely, on the ground that it did not engage in any serious analysis of the
legislative history of title VI and that the subsequent Bakke majority had
decisively undercut Lau. 58 Four Justices would have overruled Lau insofar
as it held that title VI originally prohibited discriminatory effects as well as
discriminatory intent, but would have reaffirmed it insofar as it upheld the
validity of the administrative regulations implementing and interpreting title
VI. 59 Only one Justice sought to reconcile the two precedents. Justice White
interpreted title VI to prohibit discriminatory effects on disadvantaged mi-
norities which were the main object of title VI's concerns (Lau), but to pro-
hibit only intentional discrimination against majority groups (Bakke) °
Guardians Association is the nightmare example of the super-strong pre-
sumption against overruling statutory precedents. Although Justice White's
reconciliation of Lau and Bakke may seem most consistent with the strict
rule against overruling statutory precedents, no other Justice adopted it.
Eight Justices voted to overrule Lau entirely or partially, yet after all the
dust clears it is Lau's rule of discriminatory effects that prevails over Bakke's
rule of discriminatory intent, because five Justices agreed that title VI's dis-
criminatory effects regulations were valid. That, too, seems anomalous:
How can the statute itself be decisively interpreted to prohibit only inten-
tional discrimination, while the implementating regulations prohibit discrim-
inatory effects as well?61
ring discriminatory effects to be consistent with title VI. Id. at 567. Justice White simply concurred
in the result. Id. at 569. Three Justices concurred in the result, based on their view that whatever
was prohibited in title VI, the regulations were a valid exercise of delegated administrative lawmak-
ing. Ia. at 571 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
55. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
56. Ido at 287 (Powell, J.); ido at 328 (opinion of Brennan, J., with White, Marshall & Blackmun,
JJ.).
57. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
58. Id. at 610-11 (Powell, J., with Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); id
at 612-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
59. Id at 615-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting); iad at 639-42 (Stevens, J., with Brennan & Blackmun,
JJ., dissenting).
60. Id. at 589-91.
61. The apparent answer is that there are two different statutory provisions. Section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 sets forth substantive standards, arguably barring only intentional discrim-
ination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982). Section 602 delegates rulemaking authority to executive depart-
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A third situation in which Justice Frankfurter's proceduralist exception
may be applicable is when "new" legislative history has been uncovered that
undermines a rule created by old precedents. 62 Again, the rationale for the
super-strong presumption is arguably inapplicable when the precedent is
grounded upon inaccurate information. Again, however, this exception is
subject to manipulation, as illustrated in Monell v. Department of Social
Services.63
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now known as section 1983) 64
subjects "persons" to liability for depriving people of their federal constitu-
tional and statutory rights under color of state law. The Court in Monroe v.
Pape 65 held that municipalities are not "persons" for purposes of the statute.
Among other bases for this holding, Monroe relied on Congress' rejection in
1871 of the "Sherman Amendment" to the bill that became the Civil Rights
Act.6 6 The amendment would have expressly subjected a municipality to
liability for damage done by persons "riotously and tumultuously
assembled."' 67
Monell overruled Monroe on the issue of whether municipalities are per-
sons under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, based mainly upon an extensive
reexamination of the legislative history. The Court concluded that the objec-
tions to the Sherman Amendment were not founded on a desire to immunize
cities entirely, but instead on a belief that the amendment would have carried
respondeat superior beyond constitutional bounds by subjecting cities to lia-
bility for acts of private citizens.6 8 Monell also relied on statements about
section 1 by sponsors and supporters of the Act,69 and on the Federal Dic-
tionary Act,70 to show that municipalities were usually included as "per-
ments, arguably permitting rules barring discriminatory effects. Id. § 2000d-1. The problem with
this reasoning, however, is that there is no indication in the language or legislative history of title VI
that § 601 and § 602 were not to be read in pari materia.
62. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (statutory prece-
dents should be overruled if "it appear[s] beyond doubt from the legislative history" that the earlier
interpretation was wrong) and id. at 220, 224-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (new legislative his-
tory considered probative as basis for overruling statutory precedents) with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938) (Brandeis, J.) (new evidence of Congress' intent in enacting Rules of Deci-
sion Act not enough, standing alone, to justify overruling an established statutory precedent).
63. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
64. Chapter 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
65. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
66. Id. at 187-91.
67. Id at 188-90. The Sherman Amendment was an amendment adding a new section to the
entire bill and so was not actually an amendment to § 1, which is now § 1983. Twice the Senate
passed the Sherman Amendment, and twice the House rejected the Amendment, the second time as
part of the conference bill. The reason, according to Monroe, was the asserted lack of constitutional
power to pass the statute as amended. Id
68. Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-83.
69. Id at 683-87.
70. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871).
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sons" in the statutory parlance of 1871.71
The opinion of the Court in Monell puts the case within Justice Frank-
furter's proceduralist exception, though Monell overstates the case for
Monroe's error. Monroe in fact considered much of the evidence adduced by
the Monell Court, including the Dictionary Act, which Monroe found inap-
plicable because corporate bodies were quite often held not be "persons"
under the Constitution in 1871.72 The primary direct evidence adduced by
Monell that municipalities were intended to be "persons" under section 1983
was a statement by Representative Bingham that the Act ought to implement
the fourteenth amendment's duties against governmental entities, including
cities. While supportive of Monell's result, Bingham's statements were not
directed specifically at section 1 of the Act, and Bingham was not one of the
House managers of the Act.73 It is curious that during the extensive congres-
sional debate in 1871, no one else raised the possibility that section 1 would
apply to municipalities. 74 In short, while Monell made quite a plausible de-
fense of its interpretation of section 1983, it hardly unearthed the sort of new
and highly persuasive evidence that would have made it "'beyond doubt
from the legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended
the meaning of the [section].' 75
Justice Frankfurter's proceduralist exception is clearly a popular justifica-
tion for overruling statutory precedents. The Court will rely on it whenever
possible-and sometimes even when not really possible. Cantor, Southern
Motor Carriers, Guardians Association, and Monell suggest that the
proceduralist exception is sometimes a makeweight for other reasons for
overruling a statutory precedent. There are, indeed, many instances in which
the Court's overruling of statutory precedents has not been reasonably based
upon proceduralist justifications invoked by the Court.76 Many of these
71. Monell, 436 U.S. at 688-89.
72. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190-91; see Monell, 436 U.S. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing ambiguous nature of judicial decisions on application of various constitutional provisions to
municipalities).
73. Monell, 436 U.S. at 721-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74. See id.
75. Id at 700 (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring)); cf Stewart, The
Supreme Court Rewrites a Law: Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 15 URB. LAW. 503 (1983)
(favoring Monroe's interpretation of original intent of Congress).
76. For example, the Supreme Court in recent years has tended to rely on the recharacterization
of important reasoning as dicta to present its reasoning as consistent with stare decisis. Compare
NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 107 S. Ct. 2002, 2013 n.15 (1987) (re-
jecting "dictum" in ABC v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411 (1978)) with id. at 2018 (White, J., dissent-
ing) (claiming that majority "mischaracterizes" cited portion of ABC as dictum). Compare North
Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 336, 341 (1986) (re-
jecting "dictum" in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980)) with id. at 344-45
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Carey should control the case at hand). Compare Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-34 (1985) (finding agency enforcement policy unreviewable, distinguish-
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cases, however, can be explained by a second exception to the super-strong
presumption against overruling statutory precedents.
B. THE EXCEPTION FOR COMMON LAW AND
CONSTITUTIONALIZED STATUTES
Dissenting in Monroe, in which he most completely developed his
proceduralist exception, Justice Frankfurter also argued that statutes having
constitutional dimensions, such as section 1983, might be more freely reinter-
preted than ordinary statutes. 77 Justice Frankfurter's apparent rationale was
that statutes intimately tied to constitutional developments ought to be rein-
terpreted as consitutional law evolves. Since the Court follows a more re-
laxed stare decisis role in constitutional cases, it should take similar liberties
in reinterpreting those related statutes. This exception helps explain many of
the Court's overrulings of statutory precedents, 78 and it has broadened into a
ing other cases which had found reviewability) with id at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (new pre-
sumption of unreviewability that majority creates "is fundamentally at odds with rule-of-law
principles firmly embedded in our jurispudence, because it seeks to truncate an emerging line of
judicial authority subjecting enforcement discretion to rational and principled constraint"). Com-
pare South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 377 n.14 (1984) (disavowing "dictum" in Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974)) with id. at 385-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that Bob Jones accurately and unambiguously construed statute). Compare American
Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 573 n. 12 (1982) (imposing
antitrust liability on theory of apparent authority and maintaining that UMW v. Coronado Coal
Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) and Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) do not preclude use
of this theory) with id. at 578-84 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority "launches on an
uncharted course," and "makes new law, largely ignoring existing precedent" (emphasis in origi-
nal)). Compare NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 186-90
(1981) (finding erroneous and unnecessary to the decision statements in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) that Wagner Act is inapplicable to all "confidential employees") with id. at
295-97 (Powell, J., dissenting) (relying on Bell and finding it a correct interpretation of congres-
sional intent). Compare McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 141 & n.19 (1981) (rejecting "dictum"
from East Carroll Parish School v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam), and concluding that
court-ordered reapportionment plans proposed by local government plans must meet preclearance
procedures under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c) with id. at 154 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that East
Carroll explicitly held that reapportionment plans adopted pursuant to court order need not follow
preclearance procedures).
77. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 221-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct 1442, 1473 (1978) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (doctrine of stare
decisis less rigorously applied to civil rights cases).
78. See Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2947-48 (1987)
(overruling precedent setting forth test for congressional waiver of states' eleventh amendment im-
munity); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987) (extradition statute in pari materia with
extradition clause of Constitution); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)
(title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 63, 680-81 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., with Burger, C.J., concurring) (implicitly overruling Court's earlier interpretation of
Indian-related statute because of evolution of 14th amendment discrimination law); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 480-82 (1976) (holding that Constitution does not require granting of relief under
federal habeas corpus statute to state prisoners alleging fourth amendment violations when state
provides full and fair litigation of the issue); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104, 114 (1974)
1376
HeinOnline  -- 76 Geo. L. J. 1376 1987-1988
19881 OVERRULING STATUTORY PRECEDENTS 1377
more important exception in recent years.
Like Justice Frankfurter, Justice John Paul Stevens takes stare decisis very
seriously and is today the Justice most strongly committed to the super-
strong presumption in statutory cases. 79 Nonetheless, he has argued that the
strict rule should be relaxed for statutes in which Congress has pretty much
left the courts alone to develop the statutes in a common law fashion. Thus,
in his dissenting opinion in Guardians Association, Justice Stevens stated that
"when the Court unequivocally rejects one reading of a statute, its action
should be respected in future litigation."80 In a footnote, Justice Stevens
qualified this statement. "Like most, this proposition of law is not wholly
without exceptions. Congress phrased some older statutes in sweeping, gen-
eral terms, expecting the federal courts to interpret them by developing legal
rules on a case-by-case basis in the common-law tradition."8' Justice Stevens
cited section 1983 and the Sherman Act of 1890 as examples of such "com-
mon-law statutes. '8 2
The rationale for this exception for common law statutes is that when
Congress has declared an important public policy in general, sweeping terms,
and has essentially left the courts free to mold the contours of that policy,
courts should engage in essentially a common law process of creating specific
rules, and of rescinding those rules that over time prove unworkable or in-
consistent with general policy. Just as administrative agencies that are dele-
gated lawmaking responsibilities to fill statutory gaps are routinely allowed
to change their interpretations of the statute,8 3 courts to which Congress has
(announcing standards for anti-pornography law consistent with new developments in first amend-
ment jurisprudence, despite potentially contrary precedent); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,
410 U.S. 484, 499-500 (1973) (rejecting prior decision's jurisdictional pronouncement regarding
habeas corpus relief); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 92-101 (1971) (overruling Court's earlier
view that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) requires state action).
79. See, eg., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2333, 2359 (1987) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1457-59 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bureau, 106 S. Ct. 1922 (1986) (Stevens, J.). Indeed, in solo dissenting passages, Justice
Stevens recently advocated treating lower court consensus on statutory issues as entitled to the
super-strong presumption of correctness. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2890 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Commissioner v. Fink, 107 S. Ct. 2729, 2737-38 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
80. Guardians Assn, 463 U.S. at 641 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 641 n.12.
82. Id. at 641-42 n.12.
83. See, eg., Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J.) (giving deference to and upholding Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) definition of
"source" of air pollution, even though EPA had changed its definition); NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 264-66 (1975) (NLRB may change its interpretation of § 7 of NLRA in response
to changing conditions and still receive deference for its interpretation); Local 761, Int'l Union of
Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961) (determining what activities
constitute illegal secondary boycotts calls for evolutionary response by NLRB, not quick definitive
answer).
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implicitly given the responsibilities for filling in the details of common law
statutes should also be given the leeway to experiment and overrule prior
interpretations in a common law fashion.
About half of the cases in which the Court has explicitly overruled a statu-
tory precedent in the last twenty-five years are decisions interpreting com-
mon law statutes.84 In most of those cases, Justice Stevens' exception for
common law statutes explains the Court's action much better than does the
proceduralist exception. Cantor (interpreting the Sherman Act) and Monell
(intepreting section 1983) can be better explained by an exception for consti-
tutionalized and/or common law statutes than by the proceduralist
exception.
To take another example, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp. 8 5 the Court held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary cannot be prosecuted for unlawful conspiracy pursuant to the Sher-
man Act. Although the Court did not explicitly mention the super-strong
presumption against overruling statutory precedents, it strained to avoid the
fact that rejection of the "intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine" repudiated
several Supreme Court precedents and forty years of Sherman Act doc-
trine.8 6 The Court engaged in a labored effort to invoke the proceduralist
exception; it characterized the original statement of the doctrine as dictum
and argued that Supreme Court decisions that had followed the doctrine
could have been decided the same way on other grounds.8 7 The dissent,
84. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacama Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1138-43 (1988) (ap-
pellate jurisdiction statute); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987) (Extradition Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3182); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (Sherman
Act); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (FED. R. EVID. 501); Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (section 1983); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (Sherman Act); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (habeas
statute); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (section 1985); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (Labor Management Relations Act § 301); Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (habeas statute); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (habeas stat-
ute); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965) (three-judge court statute); Harris v. United
States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963) (habeas statute); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (Labor Management
Relations Act § 301).
85. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
86. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine had its origin, albeit in dictum, in United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 322 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947): "The test of illegality under the [Sherman] Act is the
presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce. Such a restraint may
result as readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common
ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise independent." The doctrine thus
announced was the basis for the Court's holding in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598
(1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,
109 (1948).
87. 467 U.S. at 761-66.
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however, pointed out that the Court had thoroughly considered the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine, after briefing, on several occasions, and had
made the doctrine the explicit holding of no less than five precedents.88
This squabble between the Copperweld majority and dissenters is unil-
luminating and probably convinces no one that the Court is respecting stare
decisis. Instead, the best justification for eliminating the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine is the desirability of common law experimentation in the
context of the Sherman Act. The doctrine was part of the Vinson and War-
ren Courts' expansive approach to Sherman Act liability. That approach has
fallen into disfavor in the 1970s and 1980s, and no doctrine has received
more persuasive scholarly criticism than the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine.8 9 The central criticism is that the the doctrine vests unrealistic signifi-
cance in the fact of separate incorporation: A company and its internal
divisions cannot conspire under the Sherman Act, but a company and func-
tionally equivalent subsidiaries can. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
only encouraged companies to fold their subsidiaries back into the parent
corporation to prevent Sherman Act prosecution.90 Moreover, the Justice
Department after the 1960s declined to rely on the doctrine.91 Given the
increasingly apparent problems with the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,
the Court overruled it, much as a common law court would overrule outmo-
ded rules of contributory negligence. 92
Copperweld's reluctance to rely on Justice Stevens' exception for common
law statutes suggests that the exception does not enjoy the virtually unques-
tioned legitimacy of Justice Frankfurter's proceduralist exception, which
Copperweld unpersuasively tried to invoke. It is also striking that Justice
Stevens himself wrote the dissenting opinion in Copperweld and stated:
"'[W]e must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily
in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change the
Court's interpretation of its legislation.' -93 Justice Stevens has taken a simi-
88. Id. at 778-84 (Stevens, J., with Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); see supra note 86 (citing
cases).
89. See 467 U.S. at 766 n.12 (citing critical commentary).
90. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969) (after
Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), leading case following intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine, parent corporation involved simply converted subsidiary into unin-
corporated division), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
91. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777 & n.25.
92. Note that the criticisms of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine do not compel eliminating
it entirely. The Court could have created a rebuttable presumption that parent and wholly owned
subsidiaries are operated under common management and, hence, incapable of Sherman Act con-
spiracy. (Quite often a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary will be independently operated.)
Copperweld may be a case in which stare decisis concerns were too readily displaced and in which
the new rule may have as many problems as the old one.
93. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 784 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977), which refused to overrule prior interpretations of Sherman Act).
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lar position in other cases reaffirming arguably incorrect interpretations of
old civil rights statutes.94 His apparent ambivalence about his own exception
extends to the Court as a whole. Notwithstanding Copperweld and Monell,
the Supreme Court often applies the same very strict stare decisis analysis to
Sherman Act and section 1983 precedents as it does to other statutory prece-
dents.95 Indeed, the most frequently criticized example of excessively strict
stare decisis for statutory precedents is a series of decisions interpreting the
Sherman Act.
In Federal Baseball Club v. National League,96 decided in 1922, the
Supreme Court held that the American and National Leagues of baseball
could not be sued under the Sherman Act, because the business of "giving
exhibitions of base ball... [is a] purely state" affair and therefore not inter-
state commerce regulated by the Sherman Act. 97 Within a few decades,
however, baseball became big interstate business, with lucrative radio con-
tracts, and soon bore scant resemblance to the local exhibitions described in
Federal Baseball. At the same time, the Supreme Court's concept of "inter-
state commerce" came to embrace much activity that had previously been
considered local.98 Nonetheless, when the Court reexamined Federal Base-
ball thirty years later, in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,99 it refused to
overrule the obsolete precedent, because the sport had been left to develop
exempt from the antitrust laws, and the Court believed that such a major
change in antitrust policy ought to come from Congress.lc °
In the next two decades, the Court, over the objection of dissenting Jus-
94. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1459 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (adhering to Court's interpretation of Civil Rights Act of 1964 although
contrary to Stevens' view of original congressional intent); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-
92 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (adhering to 42 U.S.C. § 1982 precedent although contrary to
Stevens' view of original congressional intent).
95. Eg., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 106 S. Ct. 1922, 1930-31 (1986) (Sher-
man Act); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 n.5 (1985) (section 1983); Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 55 & n.18 (1985) (Sherman
Act); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752, 759 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(Sherman Act); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1982) (O'Connor, J., with Rehn-
quist, J., concurring) (section 1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980) (section 1983);
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 658-69 (1979) (White, J., with Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (section 1983); id. at 672-74 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(same); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979) (same); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 729-48 (1977) (Sherman Act); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 & n.12 (1976) (section
1981); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84 (1972) (Sherman Act).
96. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
97. Id. at 208-09. The Sherman Act only prohibits combinations and conspiracies restraining
trade in interstate or foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
98. See, eg., United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (insurance
business, when conducted across state lines, is interstate commerce subject to Sherman Act; over-
ruling Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869)).
99. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
100. Id. at 357.
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tices invoking stare decisis, refused to extend Federal Baseball to any other
professional athletic activity.10' Lower courts grew increasingly restive with
a statutory precedent that Judge Jerome Frank dubbed an "impotent zom-
bie" in 1949102 and that Judge Henry Friendly in 1970 found "extremely
dubious" in light of the enormous revenues professional baseball derived
from interstate television broadcasts. 03 Commentators expressed growing
hostility to the anomaly; one observed as early as 1962 that professional base-
ball was well aware that its adventitious exemption from Sherman Act liabil-
ity might soon come to an end.' 4
Many observers thought the end was near in 1971, when the Court agreed
to review a decision following Federal Baseball and Toolson. The Court once
again surprised, and dismayed, the pundits when it reaffirmed Federal Base-
ball in Flood v. Kuhn. '0 5 The Court recognized that the antitrust exemption
for baseball is "an anomaly" and "an aberration," but at least "an established
one" entitled to full stare decisis effect because of congressional acquies-
cence.' 0 6 "If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this," the Court can-
didly confessed, "it is an inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to
be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court."' 0 7
Flood v. Kuhn is an almost comical adherence to the strict rule against
overruling statutory precedents, particularly considering that the Sherman
Act has developed essentially through a common law process. If the
proceduralist exception were the only basis for overruling statutory prece-
dents (short of constitutional problems), then Flood v. Kuhn would make
sense, but (as I have demonstrated above) there are simply too many cases in
which the Court has overruled statutory precedents, such as Monell and Cop-
perweld, which have just as impressive procedural credentials as the prece-
dents upheld in Flood v. Kuhn. We are, therefore, still searching for
coherence in the Court's approach to statutory precedents.
101. See Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (Douglas, J., rein-
stating an injunction pendente lite; stating that basketball is subject to Sherman Act); Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1957) (holding Sherman Act applicable to profes-
sional football); United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1955) (holding
Sherman Act applicable to professional boxing); see also United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222,
226-30 (1955) (refusing to apply Toolson rationale to protect theatrical productions from Sherman
Act liability).
102. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1949).
103. Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
104. Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE
L.J. 907, 947 (1962).
105. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
106. Id. at 282-83.
107. Id. at 284.
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C. THE RELIANCE EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court, in Patsy v. Board of Regents,108 applied a balancing
test to determine whether the super-strong presumption against overruling
statutory precedents should be relaxed in a section 1983 case. Writing for
the Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall considered (1) whether the precedent
represented a departure from prior decisions, (2) what reliance interests had
accumulated around the precedent, (3) whether the legislative history of the
statute undermined the precedent, and (4) whether subsequent statutory de-
velopments built upon or detracted from the principle(s) indicated by the
precedent. 10 9 Two of the considerations invoked in Patsy (departure from
prior decisions and legislative history) reflect Justice Frankfurter's
proceduralist exception, but the other two reflect a different type of inquiry:
How have private parties and Congress responded to the precedent? If Con-
gress and private persons have relied upon and come to accept the precedent,
the super-strong presumption applies with full force. But if Congress has
been hostile to the precedent, and private parties have been chary of relying
on it, then why should the strict rule apply at all?
This "reliance exception" is consonant with the theoretical underpinnings
of stare decisis generally and the super-strong presumption in particular.
Where private parties have over time shaped their relations around a prece-
dent's rule, it is considered presumptively unfair to change the precedent
retroactively, and courts will not do so without strong reason. Where Con-
gress itself has relied on a precedent, the precedent may be entitled to a
super-strong presumption of correctness. Contrariwise, if Congress has
clearly not relied on the precedent, it is only entitled to normal stare decisis
protection.
The reliance exception also helps explain many cases not satisfactorily ex-
plained by the proceduralist exception and the exception for common law
statutes. For example, the reliance exception represents a plausible way to
reconcile the Supreme Court's contrasting results in Monell and Flood v.
Kuhn, both of which involved thoroughly considered precedents interpreting
common law statutes. Notwithstanding Monroe's interpretation of section
1983, local bodies had been sued as the real parties in interest in some cases,
often apparently with their acquiesence. 110 If local officials were being sued
in any event, it appears that the local governments themselves often did not
object to being included as defendants; private reliance on Monroe was
mixed. Indeed, Congress was aware of Monroe's practical shortcomings. At
least one bill was introduced to overrule Monroe (it did not pass),"' and
108. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
109. Id at 501 & n.3 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 695-701).
110. Monell, 436 U.S. at 663 & nn.5-6; id at 696; id. at 711 (Powell, J., concurring).
111. 124 CONG. REc. S117 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1977).
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when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976112 the drafters of one Senate report realized that the burdens of counsel
fees in section 1983 cases would often be borne by "State or local bodies.1 11 3
Reaction to Toolson was strikingly different. From the 1920s on, baseball
evolved under an umbrella of immunity from antitrust prosecution, and
some thought that subjecting it to such regulation in the 1970s would have
jarring effects, especially if such regulation ended the reserve clause (at issue
in Flood). More important, the legislative reaction was fairly acquiescent.
The Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly of the House Judiciary Committee
held immediate hearings on the principal alleged anticompetitive practice-
the reserve clause-and urged no action to modify Toolson, because "the
overwhelming preponderance of the evidence established baseball's need for
some sort of reserve clause."' 14 Between Toolson and Flood v. Kuhn at least
fifty bills were introduced in Congress regarding the applicability of the anti-
trust laws to athletic events; all of the bills that passed at least one of the
legislative chambers sought to expand rather than contract baseball's exemp-
tion!1 15 In short, unlike Monell, where local government defendants only
sometimes relied on their immunity and Congress had indirectly recognized
that, the Court in Flood encountered strong reliance arguments (especially
surrounding the reserve clause) and congressional acquiescence in baseball's
peculiar immunity.
The reliance exception also provides a justification for a number of other
Supreme Court decisions that have overruled statutory precedents. 116 For
example, in United States v. Lane117 the Court held that misjoinder of de-
fendants in a criminal case, in violation of rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, only requires reversal of the convictions if the misjoin-
112. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
113. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5908, 5913. The report also assumed that liability could be imposed "whether or not the
agency or government is a named party." Id.
114. H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 229 (1952).
115. For example, the Act of Sept. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)), expanded the antitrust exemption to include agreements
covering the telecasting of sports contests and the combining of professional football leagues.
116. For examples of the Court's willingness to overrule (implicitly or explicitly) a statutory
precedent based upon little private reliance and subsequent, contrary legislative developments, see
Gulfstream Aerospac. Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1138-43 (1988); Shearson/
American Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2333, 2340-41 (1987); Brown v. Hotel Employees
Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1984); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1977);
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 497-98 (1973); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334-42 (1971); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234
(1968); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 347-49
(1965).
117. 474 U.S. 438 (1986).
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der was "prejudicial."' 1 8 The Court effectively overruled McElroy v. United
States," 9 decided in 1896, which had interpreted a prior version of the stat-
ute to require reversal of criminal convictions whenever there was misjoinder
of defendants.
Although McElroy was a carefully considered statutory precedent, the
Court had few qualms about overruling it, because people do not rely on
criminal procedure rules in planning their everyday affairs and because Con-
gress had enacted legislation that moved away from the precepts of McElroy.
In 1919, Congress enacted a "harmless error" statute providing that on ap-
peal courts were to ignore "errors or defects which do not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties."' 20 In addition, the Court itself adopted rule 52(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that any error in
criminal trials "which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."
Technically these statutes did not overrule McElroy, because the precedent
had grounded its per se rule on the proposition that misjoinder is inherently a
violation of a "substantial right."' 2 ' But the approach of the subsequent stat-
utes represented legislative and judicial preference for an ad hoc, case-by-
case approach 22 and, hence, was inconsistent with the per se approach of
McElroy.
Like the others, the reliance exception by itself does not explain most of
the cases in which the Supreme Court has been willing in the last quarter
century to overrule statutory precedents. But the three exceptions explicated
by the Court cumulatively describe the occasions in which the Court is most
likely to consider overruling or modifying statutory precedents. The Court is
most willing to reconsider reasoning in a statutory precedent when the rea-
soning is not strictly necessary to the holding or when it otherwise reflects
less than thorough deliberation by the Court, when the underlying statute is
a generally worded one whose details have generally been worked out by the
judiciary, and/or when the reasoning is undermined or at least not supported
by subsequent legislative deliberation and extensive private reliance. Con-
versely, the Court is least willing to reconsider a statutory precedent whose
holding was carefully considered and reasoned, which interprets a provision
of a detailed statutory scheme, and which has on the whole generated acqui-
escent discussion in Congress or (better yet) subsequent legislation and pri-
vate activity grounded upon the validity of its interpretation.
118. Id. at 449.
119. 164 U.S. 76 (1896).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982).
121. McElroy, 164 U.S. at 80.
122. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-23 (1967) (adopting a harmless error rule in
criminal trials); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774-77 (1946) (reversing criminal convic-
tions based upon misjoinder but indicating in dictum that harmless error analysis is appropriate).
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II. ABANDONING THE SUPER-STRONG PRESUMPTION: AN EVOLUTIVE
APPROACH FOR OVERRULING STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
Part I's descriptive analysis-the super-strong presumption and its array
of exceptions-is a cumbersome approach to guide the Court's decision
whether to overrule a statutory precedent. Though the Court's apparent ap-
proach has some internal coherence, it seems more and more like a Rube
Goldberg machine, which I think mirrors the Court's practice in this area.
That is, the anchoring idea (the super-strong presumption) has proven to be
less than workable, and a series of elaborate improvisations (the array of
exceptions) have been derived to keep it limping along.
Justice William Douglas suggested twenty years ago that statutory prece-
dents ought to be reexamined more often,123 and scholarly commentators
who have analyzed the Court's hierarchy of stare decisis have been critical of
the unusual treatment of statutory precedents.124 The Court's experience
with statutory precedents in the last twenty-five years, and the silly results
the current approach sometimes generates-Flood v. Kuhn is a favorite 25-
justify an abandonment of the super-strong presumption against overruling
statutory precedents. Instead, the Court should use an "evolutive" ap-
proach, under which a statutory precedent might be overruled if its reason-
ing has been exposed as problematic and its results pernicious, and it has not
broadly influenced subsequent lawmaking and private planning. Certain fea-
tures of the evolutive approach are suggested by my analysis of the excep-
tions to the super-strong presumption. Specifically, I have developed the
evolutive approach from the Supreme Court's decisions overruling its com-
mon law precedents, as well as several statutory cases in the 1960s and early
1970s, when the super-strong presumption was not followed very rigorously.
123. Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 385 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); see Douglas, supra note 11, at 735, 746-47 (arguing for general relaxation of courts'
reluctance to overrule precedents of all types). In practice, Justice Douglas relied on stare decisis
more often than these sources would suggest. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 129,
133-34 (1965) (Douglas, I., dissenting) (invoking strict stare decisis for statutory precedents); Glid-
den Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 592 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (invoking stare decisis for
constitutional precedents); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961) (Douglas, J.) (invoking
strict stare decisis for statutory precedents).
124. R. DICKERSON, supra note 12, at 253-54 (highly critical of traditional reasons for super-
strong presumption); Easterbrook, supra note 12 (same); Maltz, supra note 12 (same).
125. For several years, I have taught Flood v. Kuhn in my Legislation class. On first reading the
case, students are almost uniformly incredulous that the Court would so blithely perpetuate the
"inconsistency and illogic of long standing." There is no need for me to criticize the decision, for it
self-destructs in the students' minds. Instead, I spend up to one class period stressing the systemic
values implicated in stare decisis and the arguable consistency in the Supreme Court's practice.
Nonetheless, in four years of teaching Flood v. Kuhn, I have persuaded exactly one student that the
decision represents a defensible approach to law.
1988] 1385
HeinOnline  -- 76 Geo. L. J. 1385 1987-1988
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
A. AN EVOLUTIVE APPROACH TO OVERRULING STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
If one rejects the super-strong presumption for statutory precedents, it
would be logical to apply normal stare decisis rules to such precedents. How
would such an approach work at the Supreme Court level? Fortunately, we
are not without practical guidance. The Court occasionally reconsiders its
own common law precedents, especially in the field of admiralty.1 26 The
Court's methodology in this small collection of cases is in striking contrast to
its typical approach in statutory cases. The Court in these cases treats its
common law precedents as presumptively valid but will overrule them if they
no longer "fit" into the evolving legal terrain and are producing anomalous
policy results. 127 A precedent is ripe for reconsideration if it has yielded un-
expected problems, or if critical legal or factual assumptions underlying the
precedent have proved erroneous or have ceased to exist. The Court is un-
likely to overturn a precedent which has become a building block on which
the Court or Congress has relied to make further legal rules, or around which
private reliance interests have gathered.
In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,128 for example, the Supreme
Court overruled its precedent requiring equal apportionment of damages in
admiralty when both vessels are partly at fault, because "subsequent history
and experience have conspicuously eroded the rule's foundations." 129 The
Court followed what I would characterize as a three-step inquiry before it
cast aside the precedent. First, the Court critically analyzed the precedent's
reasoning. The Court examined the history and policy behind the equal ap-
portionment rule and observed that the rule had been universally criticized
by judges and commentators and had been abandoned in other Western mar-
itime nations.' 30 The only policy rationale offered by the precedent was the
difficulty in determining comparative degrees of negligence; years of modern
experience with comparative negligence rules in other contexts had rendered
126. See ag., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1975) (overruling
The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855), and creating comparative
fault doctrine in admiralty); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266-68
(1972) (overruling The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866), and other precedents, due to un-
workability of strict locality test in maritime torts); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1972) (rejecting historical principle of nonrecognition of forum-selection clauses by admi-
ralty courts); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970) (overruling The Har-
risburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), and allowing wrongful death actions under maritime law); see also
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-53 (1980) (overruling Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S.
74 (1958), due to overbreadth of privilege against adverse spousal testimony).
127. In explicating the "evolutive" approach described in this section, I have been influenced not
just by the Court's decisions, but also by Dean Guido Calabresi's analysis and methodology in A
Common Law for the Age of Statutes, published in 1982, which has great relevance for any student
of stare decisis.
128. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
129. Id at 403.
130. IdL at 403-04.
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that reasoning vulnerable.131 Second, the Court asked whether the old rule
caused harm to modem policy, harm that could be undone by a new rule.
The Court noted the unfairness of the equal apportionment rule, as well as
the evasions of the rule by fictive exceptions and the widespread criticism of
the rule by lower court judges. 132 From this analysis, the Court concluded
that the rule was no longer working and that a comparative negligence rule
would be more consonant with modem policy. Third, the Court looked for
public or private reliance (a classic stare decisis concern) on the precedent.
The Court found none, in part because the equal apportionment rule is so
silly. 133 Reliable Transfer also rejected the Flood v. Kuhn argument that
Congress is the better forum for such relief. "'This Court ... has not hesi-
tated to overrule an earlier decision and settle a matter of continuing con-
cern, even though relief might have been obtained by legislation,' "134 the
Court concluded.
In another admiralty case, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,135 the
Court overruled a 100-year-old precedent denying wrongful death recovery
under admiralty law. The Court stated that the precedent rested upon out-
dated legal assumptions and was obsolescent public policy in light of over-
whelming acceptance of the wrongful death cause of action at the state and
federal level.136 The Court had no trouble demonstrating the "barbarous"
nature of the old rule and its pernicious consequences. 137 In the most in-
triguing part of the opinion, the Court reasoned that the stare decisis con-
cerns of excessive litigation, reliance, and respect for the judiciary are not
compelling when the proposed new rule is significantly more consistent than
the precedent with the "primary rules of behavior" that social mores and
public policy have fostered over time.138 "'If the new remedial doctrine
serves simply to reenforce and make more effectual well-understood primary
obligations, the net result of innovation may be to strengthen rather than to
disturb the general sense of security.' 139 In Moragne, as in Reliable Trans-
fer, the Court found no clear congressional reliance on the outdated prece-
dent. On the other hand, in at least one recent case, the Court decided not to
overrule a common law precedent on the ground that Congress had relied on
131. Id at 407. The Court also rejected the argument that a clear division of damages facilitates
out-of-court settlements. Id at 407-08.
132. Id at 404-07.
133. Id at 409-10.
134. Id at 409 n.15 (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 n.1 (Brandeis J., dissenting)).
135. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
136. Id at 388-93.
137. Id at 379-88.
138. Id at 403.
139. Id at 404 (quoting H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law 577 (tent. ed. 1958)).
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it in subsequent legislative activity.140
These common law decisions suggest the following three inquiries when
the Supreme Court reconsiders a precedent: (1) Informed by criticism of the
precedent and its reasoning by commentators, lower court judges, and the
Court's own opinions, can the Court now say with confidence that the prece-
dent was wrongly decided? (2) Is the precedent not just wrong, but also
pernicious, detracting from overall national policies? (3) Do the policy
problems engendered by the rule outweigh the potential unfairness to private
persons and the uncertainty for the other rules based upon the challenged
rule, which will occur if the precedent is overturned? Only if all three ques-
tions are answered in the affirmative should the precedent be overruled.
Consistent with traditional stare decisis (which I do not reconsider in this
article), this is a hard test to pass.
These three inquiries are interrelated, of course, and one feature important
to all three is the extent to which a precedent has become obsolescent. The
extent to which private parties, Congress, and the Court itself rely upon the
precedent over time depends, in part, on whether the precedent is consonant
with other public policies and other developments in society. Each decision
rests upon a complex array of assumptions about society and public policy.
If those assumptions are undermined, the presumptive validity of the prece-
dent is usually weakened; public lawmakers find it an unpersuasive policy
paradigm, and private citizens are less likely to count on the precedent to
make their plans. Hence, if society evolves "away" from the precedent, it is
vulnerable to being overruled-unless it had become a cornerstone of legisla-
tive or judicial policy before its obsolescence became clear. In that event,
more powerful arguments are required to overrule the precedent, whether it
is a common law or a statutory precedent.
Though this evolutive approach is mainly characteristic of the Supreme
Court's treatment of common law precedents, several of the Court's statu-
tory decisions (especially in the period from 1961 to 1972) have rejected set-
tled interpretations of federal statutes for similar reasons. 141 Two cases from
140. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271-73 (1979).
141. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1971) (overruling Collins v. Hardyman, 341
U.S. 651 (1951), "in light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that have passed since
[Collins]"); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)
(overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), because of unnecessary and unforeseen hinder-
ances to judicial administration caused by its mutuality of estoppel rule); Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (discussed infra notes 148-62 and accompany-
ing text); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968) (overruling Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), in part because of changes in constitutional and statutory policies
since 1906); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-40 (1968) (overruling Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S.
574 (1960), to make habeas statute work better); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 60-67 (1968) (over-
ruling McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) because its prematurity rule in habeas corpus litigation
shown over time to be at odds with purposes underlying federal writ of habeas corpus); Swift & Co.
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this period illustrate the use of an evolutive approach to statutory precedents.
The first case is Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 142 which overruled a precedent
interpreting the old Three-Judge Court Act 143 to require the convening of
three-judge courts to hear cases involving Supremacy Clause preemption of
state law.144 The Court carefully demonstrated the historical errors made in
the prior precedent, its criticism by commentators, and the confusion and
waste it had occasioned in the lower courts. There was little if any private
reliance on the precedent, and Congress and the Court had not used it as a
building block for further developments.1 45 "Unless inexorably commended
by statute, a procedural principle of this importance should not be kept on
the books in the name of stare decisis once it is proved to be unworkable in
practice; the mischievous consequences to litigants and courts alike from the
perpetuation of an unworkable rule are too great."' 146
The author of the Court's opinion in Wickham was the second Justice
John Harlan, also the author of the opinion in Moragne. Although Justice
Harlan believed strongly in stare decisis, he was willing to overrule statutory
as well as common law precedents when they were demonstrably obsolete,
and his opinions in the 1960s are a rich source of evolutive methodology.1 47
v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124 (1965) (overruling Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S.
153 (1962); Kesler rule governing distribution of judicial responsibility shown unworkable); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-38 (1963) (overruling Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950); requirement
that prisoner seek certiorari in Supreme Court as condition for applying for federal habeas proven
to be unnecessary procedural hurdle); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198-201 (1962)
(overruling Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S. 437
(1955); decisions subsequent to Westinghouse destroyed its contention that § 301 of Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA) does not grant federal jurisdiction in suit by union to enforce em-
ployee rights); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 217-22 (1961) (overruling Commissioner v.
Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), which held that embezzled money is not taxable income, in part
because subsequent decisions distinguishing Wilcox have devitalized it); see also Zchernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429, 443-57 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (advocating overruling Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), and arguing that Clark's interpretation of article IV of 1923 Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany should be reassessed in light of subse-
quent events); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 158-66 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting in part) (advocating overruling Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930), and argu-
ing that Lindgren's sweeping dictum, that Jones Act preempts entire field of liability for injuries to
seamen, has been undercut by subsequent decisions).
142. 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
143. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (formerly codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1-2, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976).
144. Before Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), the Three-Judge Court
Act was thought to apply only when a state statute allegedly violated a substantive portion of the
Constitution. Kesler held that the Act applied when a state law was allegedly preempted by a
federal provision and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
145. Wickham, 382 U.S. at 120-25.
146. Id at 116.
147. In addition to Moragne and Wickham, other examples include Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653
(1969); Zchernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,443 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result); Walker v.
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His opinions are particularly acute analyses of the various ways in which the
Court's interpretations of statutes may have unanticipated consequences.
One related theme that does not often appear in his opinions is the way in
which statutory precedents can be superseded by the complex interactions of
different, and changing, statutory policies.
An excellent example of the evolutive approach in this context is Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770.148 The Norris-LaGuardia
Act of 1932149 forbids federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor rela-
tions controversies. The Supreme Court in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkin-
son 150 held that the Act bars injunctive relief against a strike called in
violation of a no-strike clause in a labor-management collective bargaining
agreement and in the face of employer requests for arbitration pursuant to
the agreement's arbitration clause.' 5 ' Boys Markets overruled Sinclair,
notwithstanding the super-strong presumption and the Court's recognition
that Congress had been urged to reevaluate the Court's decisions in this
area.' 52 The Court emphasized that Sinclair was a "significant departure"
from prior decisions (Justice Frankfurter's proceduralist exception), but that
alone was not critical, for Sinclair was a reasoned departure.1 53 Instead,
what was critical for the Court was that "in light of developments subsequent
to Sinclair," it had become clear that the precedent "frustrate[d] realization
of an important goal of our national labor policy."'1 54
When Sinclair was decided in the early 1960s, a new but important devel-
opment in national labor policy was the encouragement of peaceful resolu-
tion of labor disputes through private arbitration. In a series of cases decided
between 1957 and 1961, the Court applied section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 to enforce arbitration clauses of collective bar-
gaining agreements.' 5 5 In the same year the Court decided Sinclair, it held
Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196, 199 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); James v. United States, 366 U.S.
213, 241 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
149. Pub. L. No. 72-65, § 4, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1982)).
150. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
151. Id at 210-15.
152. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 240-41.
153. Note that Justice Brennan, who would later write the decision overruling Sinclair, wrote a
strong dissenting opinion in Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 215 (Brennan, J., with Douglas & Harlan, JJ.,
dissenting).
154. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 241.
155. Three of these cases were known as the "Steelworkers Trilogy," which includes United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960). Another example is Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 363 U.S. 448
(1957).
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in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney 156 that state courts could enforce col-
lective bargaining agreements and enjoin strikes in violation of no-strike
clauses. 157 Obviously, there was some tension between the anti-injunction
policy articulated in Sinclair and the arbitration policy set forth in Charles
Dowd. The Court in Sinclair was fully aware of this tension but felt that its
resolution was justified by the legislative history of section 301 and the anti-
injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia, at least for federal courts.
The incoherence of allowing state court injunctions to enforce no-strike
promises as a condition of peaceful arbitration (Charles Dowd), but not al-
lowing federal court injunctions (Sinclair), produced trouble. An ABA com-
mittee and scholarly commentators were sharply critical of Sinclair, because
it rendered enforcement of labor arbitration more difficult, and were even
more critical of the bifurcation between federal and state remedies. 158 The
debate came to a head in 1968, when the Court held that state court lawsuits
to enforce no-strike clauses could be removed to federal court because they
raised section 301 issues.'5 9 This development "produced an anomalous situ-
ation which... [made] urgent [the Court's] reconsideration of Sinclair."'160
Unless Sinclair were overruled, state courts would have always been ousted
from jurisdiction over no-strike suits, because unions would have an incen-
tive to remove such cases to obtain Sinclair's relief from injunctions.
The unanticipated developments after Sinclair necessitated that either it or
Charles Dowd be overruled-so stare decisis would inevitably be sacrificed.
The Court in Boys Markets chose to overrule Sinclair, primarily because
commentary and experience in the 1960s persuaded it of "the devastating
implications for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and their accom-
panying no-strike obligations if equitable remedies were not available."' 161
The Court, further, rejected Sinclair's reconciliation of section 301 and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, by emphasizing the shift in national labor policy
from protection of the nascent labor movement (Norris-LaGuardia) to the
encouragement of collective bargaining and peaceful resolution of industrial
disputes (section 301, as interpreted). 162
156. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
157. I. at 506.
158. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248-50 nn.17-18.
159. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557, 558-60 (1968).
160. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 244.
161. Id at 247; see id at 247-49 (discussing effect on incentive to agree to arbitration clauses if
injunctive enforcement unavailable).
162. Id at 249-53.
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B. AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR REPLACING THE SUPER-STRONG
PRESUMPTION WITH AN EVOLUTIVE APPROACH FOR
OVERRULING STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
Under the evolutive approach suggested by the Court's common law deci-
sions, the Court would overrule a statutory precedent when the reasoning
underlying the precedent has been discredited over time; the precedent's con-
sequences are positively troublesome, unfair, or contrary to current statutory
policies; and practical experience suggests that the statutory goals are better
met by a new rule that does not unduly undermine the reliance interests of
Congress and private persons who reasonably acted upon the basis of the old
rule. The Court should simply abandon the rhetoric and grudging practice
of the super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents and
adopt this evolutive approach of normal stare decisis, as it has in some statu-
tory cases, such as Boys Markets. Apart from the arbitrariness of the super-
strong presumption, there are three affirmative reasons for replacing it with
something like this evolutive approach.
First, the evolutive approach is a more logical way to protect the central
goal of stare decisis: the orderly development of the law. Indeed, the excep-
tions to the super-strong presumption suggest the logic of an approach that
focuses on the continuing fit between the statutory precedent and current
policy. If a precedent can be overruled because the Court did not carefully
consider all the arguments and evidence, why shouldn't a precedent be over-
ruled when the assumptions of a careful consideration have been undone
over time? If subsequent legislative developments may justify overruling a
statutory precedent, why shouldn't other subsequent developments-in so-
cial mores, public policy, and social trends-also justify such overruling, if
they expose the precedent as a wrong turn in the judiciary's development of a
statutory scheme? Finally, aren't most statutes common law statutes, to the
extent that they have gaps and ambiguities which Congress fully expects the
judiciary to fill?
This analysis suggests that the Court's existing approach is not doing its
job-to protect precedents against unnecessary questioning, even while sacri-
ficing the clearly counterproductive ones. The super-strong presumption
protects some horrible precedents, while the array of exceptions is used to
question and undermine less egregious precedents. The super-strong pre-
sumption and its exceptions have become a game of judicial hide-and-go-
seek. The very same Justices will invoke the super-strong presumption when
they don't want to overrule a statutory precedent but will ignore it-or in-
voke a procrustean exception-when they are willing to overrule. 163 In the
163. For example, Justice Brennan, the author of Boys Markets and Monell, has in other cases
brushed aside arguments for overruling statutory precedents he likes by invocation of private reli-
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last fifteen years, fewer statutory precedents have been openly overruled, and
then only after a lengthy battle over procedural and historical arcana, but
more of them are overruled implicitly or piecemeal. It is not apparent
whether the super-strong presumption is the cause or effect of this phenome-
non. What is apparent is that this doctrinaire approach costs statutory law
some of its open and orderly development. Silly decisions like Federal Base-
ball are reaffirmed, while potentially important shifts in substantive interpre-
tation are treated as innocent clarifications of "dicta."
Second, the evolutive approach focuses on substance and policy rather
than on procedure and form. The super-strong presumption too often trig-
gers wasteful discussion of marginally relevant historical and procedural
data, while the evolutive approach focuses on the relevant policy concerns.
Recall Monell, in which the Court overruled Monroe's holding that local
governments are immune from suit under section 1983. The Court went to
great length to avoid stare decisis concerns by pigeonholing the overruling
into the proceduralist and reliance exceptions. The Court argued that
Monroe overlooked important historical evidence, and pointed out that sub-
sequent decisions permitted local governments to be held liable under section
1983.164 The Court also noted the lack of private reliance on Monroe as well
as congressional discussion assuming local entities could be sued. 165 Yet the
dissent persuasively countered each claim with a counterclaim: the historical
evidence provides not insubstantial support for Monroe's result;166 subse-
quent decisions allowing section 1983 lawsuits against local governments did
not pose the Monroe issue for the Court, and indeed Monroe was reaffirmed
as least three times when it was addressed; 167 municipal insurance policies
ance and legislative acquiescence. E.g., Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 107 S.
Ct. 2941, 2968 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1450 n.7 (1987); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S.
61 (1985); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
215-16 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist has invoked the super-strong presumption (sometimes in rather strong
language) to protect certain precedents. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 715-
16 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 502
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In other cases, however, he has been ready to overrule statutory
precedents. E.g., Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1474 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting); Busic v.
United States, 446 U.S. 398, 418 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The oddest history is that of Justice Byron White. He wrote one of the leading defenses of the
super-strong presumption in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977). See also Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 60 (1977) (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). Yet he often votes to overrule statutory precedents, and in at least two recent cases he has
voted to overrule or narrow precedents he had joined. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465 (White, J., dis-
senting); Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 584.
164. Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-90, 695-97, 700-01.
165. Id. at 696-700.
166. Id at 719-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 714-16.
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and indemnity ordinances surely constituted significant local reliance on the
immunity guaranteed by Monroe, 168 and no statute passed after Monroe ex-
plicitly or implicitly negated it.169 All of this debate takes up over forty
pages of the United States Reports. To what effect? Surely little of this mate-
rial was persuasive one way or the other to members of the Court.
The best justification for overruling Monroe is evolutive. 170 Just as in Boys
Markets, the Court in Monell was confronted with a statutory precedent that
had unanticipated consequences which became increasingly anomalous over
time. The primary anomaly was a technical one. Monroe held that munici-
palities were immune from section 1983 lawsuits, and the Court in Moor v.
County ofAlameda 171 extended the immunity to counties. In both cases, the
Court relied on the fact that cities and counties were subdivisions of the state
and were instrumentalities for administering state law.172 During this same
period, section 1983 was the primary basis for desegregation lawsuits against
school boards-also subdivisions of the state administering state law-yet
the Court routinely decided those cases. 173 In the 1970s, school boards ob-
jected that they, too, should have Monroe immunity. Not only was it hard to
think of good reasons to exclude local school boards from an immunity given
cities and counties, but in many cases (including Monell) the defendant
school board had excellent arguments that it was actually an agency or de-
partment of a city.174 The Monell Court was caught in a wholly unantici-
pated logical bind: Either extend Monroe to cover at least some school
boards, or overrule it.
The former option was unattractive, in part because of the desegregation
cases, but also in part because of substantive problems with the Monroe im-
munity rule in the 1960s and 1970s. The main holding of Monroe was not its
immunity for municipalities, but instead its holding that section 1983's state
action requirement is satisfied without a showing that state law allows the
challenged conduct. 175 This holding, as well as the expansion of constitu-
168. Id. at 717.
169. Id at 716-17.
170. Much of the following discussion is suggested by the petitioner's brief in Monell (which did
not ask the Court to overrule Monroe) and by Justice Powell's thoughtful concurrence in the case.
Justice Powell stated that the stability value of stare decisis must be weighed against "the necessity
of change, lest rules 'simply persis[t] from blind imitation of the past.'" Id at 709 n.6 (quoting
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
171. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
172. Moor, 411 U.S. at 708 n.24; Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190.
173. Between 1954 and 1976, the Court itself decided at least 19 desegregation cases brought
against school boards under § 1983, and in eight of those cases the only basis for federal jurisdiction
was 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the jurisdictional predicate for § 1983. Petitioner's Brief at 14-15, Monell
(No. 75-1914).
174. See Respondent's Brief at 18-23, Monell (No.75-1914). But see Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4-
14, Monell (No. 75-1914).
175. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
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tional and statutory civil rights in the 1960s, transformed section 1983 in
ways that cut against the Court's holding that municipalities could not be
sued. Section 1983 became an important mechanism through which local as
well as state officials could be held accountable for their unconstitutional
actions, even when they were merely acting pursuant to local government
policy. Obviously, in such cases, plaintiffs had no real quarrel with the local
officials, but were attacking local policies. Naturally, when local officials
were sued under these circumstances, their defense was sometimes provided
by the municipality or county, which might also pay any money judgment. 176
Moreover, with the liberalization of class action rules, section 1983 became a
mechanism for effecting structural reform in state and local governments and
for removing institutional impediments to constitutional protections. That
the objects of the restructuring-local governments-were not parties in
these cases became a striking anomaly. Whatever the Supreme Court may
have said, local governments were often the real defendants. Commentators
cogently criticized this anomaly, 177 and lower courts began to get around it
by implying a cause of action under the fourteenth amendment. 178 In the
absence of compelling historical evidence or public and private reliance,
there was little reason in 1978 to support blanket immunity for local
governments.
While I agree with the Monell result, there are important substantive
counterarguments supporting Monroe. Like the Court, I assume that munic-
ipalities indemnified and represented their officials when they were sued, but
this point is not supported by empirical surveys (to my knowledge). Section
1983 lawsuits have perhaps become too numerous, and there is some evi-
dence that an unusually large number of them are frivolous. If this is true,
shouldn't local governments enjoy some kind of limited immunity? The
Court has in fact accorded a limited immunity to local governments, 179 but
will this really insulate them from frivolous lawsuits? These are hard ques-
tions, about which there is virtually no discussion in Monell. Rather than
arguing about arcane legislative history, the Court's subsequent citations of
Monroe, and arguable congressional acquiescence in the precedent, the dis-
senting opinion in Monell might have closely examined the policy conse-
quences of overruling Monroe. The Court, in turn, might usefully have
focused its attention on the policy consequences of its decision, and perhaps
176. Monell, 438 U.S. at 713 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring).
177. See, e.g., Note, Accountability for Government Misconduct Limiting Qualified Immunity
and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 938, 971-79 (1976).
178. See, e.g., Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
179. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1297-98 (1986) (municipality only liable
for acts in pursuance of municipal custom or policy); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808
(1985) (same).
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invited further briefing on these topics.180
In short, the reasons for overruling Monroe have little to do with the legis-
lative history of the 1871 statute, and a lot to do with the practical and theo-
retical evolution of the statute. One can tell a similar story about Guardians
Association, whose partial overruling of Lau is justified, not by the uneven
treatment of legislative history in the statutory precedent, but by the evolu-
tion of our ideas about "discrimination" in the two decades since the enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.181 In my view, virtually all of the
leading Supreme Court decisions overruling statutory precedents can be bet-
ter justified by the evolution of statutory policy and debate away from the
precedent, than by the scholastic discussion of whether the overruled prece-
dent was the result of a deliberative process, with full briefing, and the
like.182 And other decisions might have properly overruled or at least lim-
ited statutory precedents if the Court had focused on substantive points. 183
180. None of the parties in Monell even asked the Court to overrule Monroe.
181. Our society's commitment to equality has undergone a significant evolution in the last 35
years. The original focus of concern was open bigotry-refusal to serve black travelers in restau-
rants, determined segregation in education, and public policies obviously targeted at racial minori-
ties. Few practice that sort of open bigotry anymore; we have learned, however, that substantially
eliminating open bigotry has not yielded a society of equality for blacks, both because the effects of
previous discrimination are long lasting and because covert discrimination still exists. Moreover,
the anti-discrimination principle is now vigorously applied to protect women, the elderly, and the
handicapped, groups more subtly discriminated against. Thus, in the 1970s an important focus of
concern was discriminatory effects, a focus reflected in Lau.
On the other hand, Lau's holding that title VI itself flatly prohibits discriminatory effects seems
in retrospect unnecessarily broad. A danger recognized in the debates growing out of affirmative
action is that making decisions preferring historically disadvantaged groups may ultimately rein-
force invidious discrimination and race consciousness. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
254-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.). Critics of the expansion of the anti-discrimination principle argue that it
should not apply to other groups in the same way it does to racial groups. Discrimination against
the elderly, who are subsidized by society in many ways, is quite different from discrimination
against blacks, who bear the burden of historical oppression. In light of the intense policy debate-
most of which was not anticipated either by Congress in 1964 or by Lau in 1974-it is a good idea
to leave room for administrative flexibility interpreting title VI, as the Court did in Guardians
Association.
Much of this discussion is taken from Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-96 (1985) (inter-
preting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act), and Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 615-24 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See generally Fiss, The Fate of the Idea Whose Time Has Come: Anti-Discrimination
Law in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHi. L. REv. 742, 764-70
(1974); Sullivan, The Supreme Court-Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986).
182. Some recent examples of cases where the overruling is particularly well explained by evolu-
tive considerations include Gulfstrean Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133,
1138-43 (1988) (intense lower court criticism of wasteful appellate jurisdiction precedent); Welch v.
State Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2947-48 (1987) (evolution of 11th
amendment jurisdiction); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)
(practical experience under Sherman Act and intense academic criticism).
183. Apart from Flood v. Kuhn, my favorite candidate for overruling is Caminetti v. United
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Third, an evolutive approach is more consistent with our society's con-
cepts of law, and with the comparative institutional competence of courts
and legislatures, than is the super-strong presumption against overruling
statitory precedents. The remainder of this part is devoted to these argu-
ments, for they return us to the original justifications for the Court's pro-
fessed reluctance to overrule statutory precedents.
C. UNTENABLE ARGUMENTS FOR THE SUPER-STRONG PRESUMPTION
The traditional argument for the super-strong presumption is that once the
Court interprets a statute, Congress is the institution competent to change
that interpretation. This basic argument, appealing to separation of powers
concepts, has been formulated in several different ways. The three main vari-
ations of this argument are explored here. I maintain that the traditional
argument rests upon unrealistic views about statutory interpretation and the
legislative process. Neither logic nor experience suggests any good reason to
treat statutory precedents differently from common law precedents.
1. The Judicial Legislation Argument
A formalist conception of separation of powers might view an evolutive
model for overruling statutory precedents as judicial usurpation of legislative
power. Forty years ago, Professor Horack set forth this argument for the
super-strong presumption. When the Court interprets a statute, "[t]he statute
to that extent becomes more determinate, or, if you will, amended to the
extent of the Court's decision .... After the decision, whether the Court
correctly or incorrectly interpreted the statute, the law consists of the statute
plus the decision of the Court."'184 If the Court were to overrule the first
interpretation, it would be engaging in "legislative" activity, without any of
the safeguards of normal legislative action-public debate, bicameral ap-
proval, presentment to the President. "Unless Congress has acted, neither
the Court nor anyone else can determine whether or not its interpretation
was inconsistent with the intent of Congress." 18 5
Horack's argument has been reiterated by individual Justices a number of
times over the years, most recently at the end of the 1986 Term.' 8
6 Its most
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), which interpreted the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, to criminalize
interstate transportation of a person for purposes of nonmarital sex. This precedent, reaffirmed by a
divided Court in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), should be ripe for reconsideration
if the statute is ever invoked for this purpose. See United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1100-01
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (noting criticisms of Caminetti and other decisions applying Mann Act
to mere extramarital sex and suggesting that changing sexual mores may have rendered these deci-
sions obsolete).
184. Horack, supra note 12, at 250-51 (emphasis in original).
185. Id. at 252.
186. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2333, 2359 (1987) (Stevens. J.,
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celebrated, and forceful, articulation was in Justice Hugo Black's dissenting
opinion in Boys Markets. Justice Black argued that the Court's willingness to
overrule Sinclair arguably violated article I of the Constitution, which as-
signs all "legislative" responsibilities to Congress. 187 "When the law has been
settled by an earlier case, then any subsequent 'reinterpretation' of the statute
is gratuitous and neither more nor less than an amendment: it is no different
in effect from a judicial alteration of language that Congress itself placed in
the statute."18 s
This formalist "judicial legislation" argument has never been accepted by
a majority of the Court as a justification for the super-strong presumption,
and it is inconsistent with the Court's actual practice of overruling statutory
precedents quite frequently. It would require a very powerful formalist argu-
ment to work such a radical transformation in the Court's stare decisis prac-
tice. The argument developed by Professor Horack and Justice Black does
not constitute such a powerful formalist argument.
The appeal of a formalist argument is strongest when based upon the plain
meaning of a constitutional text. 'The Constitution, however, does not set
forth any standards for stare decisis. Article I simply vests the "legislative
Power" in the Congress, and article III just as simply vests the "judicial
Power" in the Supreme Court and whatever inferior courts Congress might
create. While many of the framers assumed that federal courts would adhere
to precedents,' 89 there is no evidence that anyone considered stare decisis
principles important to, or a part of, the constitutional scheme. Moreover,
nothing in the Constitution vests Congress with all "lawmaking" powers, as
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 417 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392, 406 (1965)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
187. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 259 (Black, J., dissenting).
188. Id at 257-58. In the 1940s, however, Justice Black frequently joined opinions overruling
statutory precedents even when constitutional concerns were not present. Examples include Toucey
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), and Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
Moreover, Justice Black wrote one of the most controversial decisions overruling a statutory prece-
dent. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1948). In several important cases, Justice
Black dissented when the majority invoked stare decisis for a statutory precedent. See, e.g., Francis
v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445,452 (1948) (Northern Pac. R.R. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 (1904),
ought to be reexamined because of new legal circumstances); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.
14, 20 (1946) (Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), ought to be overruled because of
new societal attitudes). By the 1960s, however, Justice Black was more reluctant to overrule statu-
tory precedents and often dissented from decisions to that effect. James v. United States, 366 U.S.
213, 222 (1961) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting from the overruling of Commissioner
v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1958)). Note also that Justice Black was the author of Sinclair, the prece-
dent overruled in Boys Markets.
189. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("To avoid
an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict
rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them.").
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the formalist argument seems to assume. 190 Indeed, even it it did, the specific
argument made by Professor Horack and Justice Black would be vulnerable
to attack. If every judicial interpretation of a statute were tantamount to a
legislative amendment, as they argue, does that not utterly conflate article I
and article III? The argument's distinction between acceptable judicial law-
making (the original interpretation) and unacceptable judicial lawmaking
(the overruling) is essentially a semantic one, with no persuasive formal justi-
fication.1 91 Why should an errant initial interpretation of legislative expecta-
tions be considered acceptable judicial lawmaking, and a later, corrective
interpretation be considered usurpation?
The only formalist principle that even seems relevant is that of legislative
supremacy, and that principle provides no better support for the judicial leg-
islation argument. The lawmaking supremacy of Congress is not necessarily
undermined, as a formal matter, when the Court overrules its own prior in-
terpretation of a statute. Just as Congress could have overruled the Court's
original interpretation, so it can always reinstate it.192
Moreover, in three different situations, the strict formalist position taken
by Professor Horack and Justice Black would actually undermine, rather
than subserve, legislative supremacy. First, if the earlier interpretation of the
statute is clearly incorrect in identifying the expectations of the enacting
Congress, the Court elevates reliance on its own error above legislative ex-
pectations if it does not overrule the precedent.193 Second, if the earlier inter-
pretation of the statute is inconsistent with later statutory policies (including
other judicial interpretations), adherence to the earlier interpretation under-
mines ongoing legislative expectations. Third, if the earlier interpretation
proves unworkable, adherence to it cuts against the implicit legislative as-
sumption that courts will fill in statutory gaps in ways that facilitate the over-
all working of the statutory scheme. In general, the implication of the
formalist position, that statutory precedents can only be overruled if they are
190. Justice Black wrote of Congress' monopoly over "lawmaking" in his opinion for the Court
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952), but it is Justice Jackson's
more flexible concurring opinion in that case that has been influential. See, eg., Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 690 (1981) (President's actions concerning claims against Iran after release of
hostages survives separation of powers challenge).
191. Professor Horack concedes that the initial interpretation is also a form of "legislative" activ-
ity, but justifies it as "an inescapable product of the judicial process." Horack, supra note 12, at
250-51.
192. As a practical matter, Congress does not overrule Supreme Court interpretations of statutes
very often, just as it does not update statutes to reflect new developments with sufficient regularity.
But this argument is not easily invoked by formalists.
193. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 12, at 253 (highlighting illogic of the Black/Horack formal-
ist argument: "The original interpretation, which by hypothesis thwarted legislative intent, did not
invade the legislature's prerogative, whereas later corrections, which by hypothesis support the re-
sult originally intended by the legislature, would invade it.").
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unconstitutional, seems contrary to legislative supremacy. Surely the Court
shows more deference to Congress by announcing that the Court has itself
erred in divining statutory meaning than by saying that Congress has passed
an unconstitutional statute. Additionally, the formalist argument risks gen-
erating more constitutional.lawmaking. Recall Justice Brandeis' opinion in
Erie, which overruled Swift only after finding its interpretation in some nebu-
lous way unconstitutional. 194
2. The Building Block Argument
Dean Levi suggested a realist variation of the judicial legislation argu-
ment. 195 Statutory language is often ambiguous, especially when applied to
situations not contemplated by the drafters. The "meaning" of the statute in
those cases must be supplied by courts, which often have a great deal of
discretion in setting the interpretation. But "once a decisive interpretation of
legislative intent has been made, and in that sense a direction has been fixed
within the gap of ambiguity, the [C]ourt should take that direction as
given."' 96 That is, once the "direction" of the statute is set, the Court, pri-
vate parties, and perhaps even Congress will build upon that direction as
they apply and develop the statute further. Any change in the statute's direc-
tion-overruling the initial interpretation-should be left to Congress, be-
cause it is better situated in a democracy to make controversial policy
decisions.
Unlike the Horack-Black argument, Dean Levi's argument rests upon
practical, rather than semantic, concerns. Yet Dean Levi's argument seems
slender support for the super-strong presumption, which he pretty much en-
dorses. 197 If a statutory precedent does not decisively set a direction for the
194. In Erie, the Court could easily have overruled Swift on evolutive grounds: the statutory
basis for Swift's interpretation was debatable; its rule had not worked out as expected and had
produced unfairness and anomalies. This point was made by Justice Stanley Reed's concurring
opinion in Erie: "In this Court, stare decisis, in statutory construction, is a useful rule, not an
inexorable command. It seems preferable to overturn an established construction of an act of Con-
gress, rather than, in the circumstances of this case, to interpret the Constitution." 304 U.S. at 92
(citations omitted).
195. Levi, supra note 12, at 523-40.
196. Id at 523.
197. Dean Levi examines in detail the Supreme Court's refusal in Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14 (1946), to overrule Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), which held the Mann
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, applicable to criminalize the transportation of a woman across state borders
for purposes of being a mistress (an "immoral purpose" under the statute according to Caminetti).
Dean Levi apparently approves the result in Cleveland, but that seems anomalous in light of his
concerns about judicial avoidance of "controversial" choices and indecision. The Caminetti issue
has not disappeared, and lively controversy remains whether sexual activity should be a criminal
"immoral purpose." By reaffirming Caminetti, Cleveland appears foolish as well as indecisive in
retrospect.
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statute, can it then be overruled? If overruling it would not be controversial?
Shouldn't those same rules apply to overruling common law precedents?
To the extent that it supports stricter stare decisis in statutory cases, Dean
Levi's argument seems to rest upon a stark dichotomy between the develop-
ment of statutory law, on the one hand, and constitutional and common law,
on the other.198 The latter develop evolutively, through a series of decisions
that slowly build up and become an interconnected foundation of principles
and policies. No one decision stands alone. Each is connected with a spiral
of other decisions, and a decision that is incoherent with the evolving spiral
can often be overruled without undermining the overall stability of the spiral.
On the other hand, statutory law develops in a more linear fashion: the early
cases "fix" the direction of the statute-the legislative intent-and later cases
build upon the first ones. Obviously, if the Court overrules an early decision,
then much of the law is unhinged, and the stability sought by stare decisis is
deeply compromised.
Dean Levi's argument is a valid stare decisis argument, but one applicable
not just to statutory precedents. To the extent that our polity desires orderly,
stable development of law, it does not want courts to overrule foundational
cases, whether in common law or statutory law. And indeed, Dean Levi's
central point is entirely consistent with an evolutive approach: A precedent
is more vulnerable to being overruled if the surrounding "legal terrain" has
become increasingly inconsistent with the precedent, and it has become in-
creasingly anomalous. I differ with Dean Levi in that I view bdth statutory
law and common law as evolutive. 199
The Sherman Act and section 1983, to take two prominent examples, have
developed very much in Dean Levi's "spiral" common law way, rather than
in his linear statutory way. Federal Baseball did not become a cornerstone of
the Sherman Act, in large part because its reasoning and assumptions be-
came increasingly anomalous over time. They became legal vestiges, politely
ignored whenever possible. Parker v. Brown, on the other hand, may be de-
batable as a matter of policy, but it has been a more foundational case, one
on which other cases have built and which is an important keystone to Sher-
man Act policy. Parker should be harder to overrule than Federal Baseball
and Toolson, though, curiously, the latter two cases have been reaffirmed,
and only Parker has been called into question by the Court.
More complicated statutory schemes often grow through a spiral rather
than a linear process. They differ from the Sherman Act primarily in the
extent to which the statutory language and legislative history direct and
198. Levi, supra note 12, at 519, 520, 523.
199. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); see R. DWoR-
KIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986) (fully devtloped jurisprudence in which constitutional, statu-
tory, and common law interpretation are structurally similar processes).
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channel that evolution. For example, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) has grown through a spiral process in which new rules are devel-
oped by the agency and the Court over time in a common law process. The
National Labor Relations Board has frequently felt free to reevaluate its in-
terpretation of the statute, and the Court has approved some substantial
shifts. "The nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situa-
tions, invariably involves an evolutionary process for its rational response,
not a quick definitive formula as a comprehensive answer. And so, it is not
surprising that the Board has more or less felt its way.., and has modified
and reformed its standards on the basis of accumulating experience." 200 Sim-
ilarly, the Court has felt free to follow an evolutive approach in areas where
it (rather than the agency) makes NLRA policy. For instance, the Court has
shifted direction twice in the last thirty years in determining standards for
the NLRA's preemption of state law.20 1
In short, contrary to Dean Levi's argument for the super-strong presump-
tion, the development of statutory law is in many ways similar to the devel-
opment of common law. Both are bounded, and both proceed within those
bounds in a trial-and-error fashion. Each case builds upon previous ones, but
also learns from experience with previous cases.
3. The Legislative Acquiescence Argument
Among Supreme Court Justices (but not the commentators) the most pop-
ular argument for the super-strong presumption is the legal process argu-
ment that changes in statutory policy can be made by the legislature.20 2
Although Burnet is typically cited for this argument, the argument does not
support treating common law and statutory precedents differently, for each
can be corrected by the legislature.20 3 Indeed, recently when the Court has
overruled common law precedents, it has done so notwithstanding legislative
activity. For example, Moragne's overruling of an admiralty precedent bar-
200. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674
(1961), quoted in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1975).
201. The first shift came in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Conm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 155 (1976) (explicitly over-
ruling a pre-Gannon precedent). A second shift, away from the Garmon approach, has been evolv-
ing in the last decade. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 202 (1978) (NLRA does not preempt state jurisdiction in labor dispute involving
injunction against trespassing while picketing).
202. E.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 106 S. Ct. 1922, 1931 (1986); NLRB
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 473 U.S. 61, 84 (1985); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 819 n.5 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 405 (1980);
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 &
n.12 (1976); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1973).
203. Indeed, Justice Brandeis' Burnet dissent cited both common law and statutory overrulings
as examples of cases where "correction might have been secured by legislation." 285 U.S. at 406 n.1.
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ring wrongful death recovery was achieved under normal stare decisis princi-
ples even though Congress had addressed wrongful death questions in the
Death on the High Seas Act, which contained an explicit policy decision not
to extend statutory wrongful death recovery to the Moragne situation (deaths
within three miles of shore).2°4 In fact, Moragne unanimously ruled that
Congress' statutory action supported its result because it reflected the wide-
spread acceptance of wrongful death recovery among modem policymak-
ers!20 5 While the Court will hesitate to overrule its common law decisions if
Congress has actually relied on them to pass or amend statutes, it does not so
hesitate simply because Congress has legislated in the area but did not over-
rule the common law itself.20 6 There is no more reason to leave matters to
the legislature in most statutory cases than there is in common law cases, like
Moragne, that operate at the margins of statutes.
Thus, the leave-it-to-the-legislature argument is an incoherent basis for dif-
ferentiating common law and statutory precedents. It is also a fairly lame
argument. If the Court errs, why should the legislature have to make the
correction? The Court has never systematically grappled with this inquiry.
Instead, it has developed a related argument based on legislative acquies-
cence: If Congress is aware of the Court's prior statutory interpretation and
does not change it, the Court should presume that Congress has "acqui-
esced" in the interpretation.20 7 The presumption of acquiescence is consid-
ered especially strong if Congress has reenacted the statute or amended the
provision which served as the basis for the Court's earlier interpretation.208
My initial reaction to the acquiescence argument is that it is little better than
204. Judge Posner criticizes Moragne's failure to consider the legislative policy, which extended
wrongful death recovery only to death on the high seas (three miles beyond the coastline), and not
to death in coastal waters (the case in Moragne). Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 202 (1987).
205. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393-94, 397-98.
206. For another recent case, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (vesting
option to exercise spousal privilege against adverse testimony in spouse who is called to testify;
overruling Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958)).
207. "The long time failure of Congress to alter the Act after it had been judicially construed,
and the enactment by Congress of legislation which implicitly recognizes the judicial construction
as effective, is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one."
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940). More recent cases accepting a legislative
acquiescence argument include United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2066 & n.6 (1987); John-
son v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1450 n.7 (1987); Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 55 n.18 (1985); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1976); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972).
208. "Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a stat-
ute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change." Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (dictum). Other cases citing legislative reenactments of interpreted stat-
utes include Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2333, 2343 (1987); Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40
(1969).
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the leave-it-to-the-legislature argument. In most instances, Congress is either
not aware of the Court's statutory interpretations or faces no formal oppor-
tunity to examine those interpretations. Even when those interpretations are
brought to the attention of a congressional committee, the rest of Congress
usually remains unaware of them.209
In a few cases, though, the acquiescence argument has a more plausible
appeal, because a case can be made that the legislature's acquiescence be-
speaks deliberation about and approval of the interpretation. For example,
Flood v. Kuhn acknowledged the "illogic" of continuing to exempt profes-
sional baseball from the antitrust laws but justified adherence to stare decisis
in large part on grounds of implicit legislative approval. The Court noted
that after Toolson (the 1953 decision upholding the baseball exemption) more
than fifty bills were introduced in Congress in connection with the Court's
decisions.210 While some of the bills sought to strip baseball of its exemption,
most sought to expand the exemption to other professional sports. Indeed,
the only bills to be reported by committee, and the two bills passed by either
chamber of the legislature, would have expanded the immunity. 211 From
this evidence, the Court was "loath" to overrule Toolson and Federal Base-
ball "when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to
stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly
evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively." 212
Although Flood v. Kuhn is an unusually strong case for the acquiescence
argument, its analysis is problematic from at least three different perspec-
tives, each of which suggests that little meaning can usually be derived from
Congress' inaction. The first perspective is proceduralist. Legal process the-
ory poses the question: "If a legislature has discretion whether to legislate or
not to legislate, how can significance rationally be attached to its decision not
to do so?"213 Congress' failure to modify the illogical exclusion of baseball,
and only baseball, from the antitrust laws might be the result of any combi-
209. See generally Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Ven-
ture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U.L. REv. 737 (1985); Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Un-
said: Construing the Sounds of Congressional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
210. Flood, 407 U.S. at 281-82.
211. As detailed in Respondents' Brief at 34-36, Flood (No. 71-32), bills were introduced and
hearings on the topic held in 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1964, and 1965. In 1958, the House voted for
a bill (H.R. 10378) expanding the exemption to other professional sports, but the Senate took no
action. In 1960 and 1964, a Senate committee recommended similar legislation; and in 1965, the
Senate passed such a bill (S. 950), but the House took no action. "Baseball has consistently sup-
ported such legislation" to expand the exemption to other sports, respondents piously announced.
Id at 33 n. **
212. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84.
213. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
Law 1395 (tent. ed. 1958).
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nation of reasons:214
(1) positive legislator approval of the Court's decisions;
(2) legislator apathy concerning the application of antitrust rules to pro-
fessional sports;
(3) legislator disapproval of the Court's decisions, but disagreement
among legislators as to what should be done (e.g., overrule the baseball ex-
emption or expand it to other sports);
(4) legislator disapproval of the Court's decisions, but procedural road-
blocks to proposed legislation (e.g., committee or subcommittee opposition,
House Rules Committee opposition, Senate filibuster, threatened presidential
veto);,
(5) legislator disapproval of the Court's decisions, but other issues more
important for the legislative agenda and no time to deal with the baseball
exemption;
(6) legislator disapproval of the Court's decisions and no opposition to
legislation, but legislation still forestalled due to compromises and logrolling.
As a matter of the legal process, "[ilt would require very persuasive circum-
stances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this Court from reexamin-
ing its own doctrines," argued Justice Frankfurter. Because of the many
possible reasons for legislative inaction, "we walk on quicksand when we try
to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal
principle." 215
The vagaries of the political process make it hard to determine what Con-
gress' "positive inaction" meant. The logical inferences that can be drawn
undermine the Court's own inaction as much as support it. Doesn't the his-
torical evidence suggest that the political process was troubled by the Court's
arbitrary line-drawing? Why else would so many bills have been introduced?
Why else would some of the bills have been reported out of committee and
passed by one of the chambers? Don't twenty years of legislative stalemate
on the immunity issue suggest that a political solution was not workable?
214. The list in text is adapted from id at 1395-96. Some of the speculation may seem fanciful,
but it was a very real consideration in the 1970s, when many members of Congress actively worked
to attract a baseball team to the District of Columbia. Right after Flood v. Kuhn it appeared to at
least one informed observer that "there is more bicameral interest in where baseball will be played
than in the legalities of the sport." Martin, The Aftermath of Flood v. Kuhn: Professional Base-
ball's Exemption from Antitrust Regulation, 3 WEsT. ST. U.L. REv. 262, 280 (1976).
215. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940); see Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1473 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think we should admit
that vindication by Congressional inaction is a canard."); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 287 n.3
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Hallock); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946)
("It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of
law."). The rhetoric in this Hallock line of cases is, of course, inconsistent with the rhetoric in the
cases cited supra notes 207 and 208. I examine this tension in Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative
Inaction (draft May 1988).
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That only the Court itself could untangle the incoherence created by its own
decisions?216
This legal process argument, of course, suggests a response. Since most of
the legislative activity sought to expand the exemption to other sports, it
would be anomalous for the Court to move in the opposite direction by over-
ruling Federal Baseball and Toolson. This is a good argument, and probably
persuaded a majority of the Court, but it is subject to a powerful counter-
argument. That is, "public choice theory," the application of economic in-
sights to political behavior, suggests that the pattern of legislative proposals
following Toolson is a predictable response of the political process but illus-
trates the chief systemic problem of the political process-its tendency to
pander to small, well-organized groups. In a nutshell,2 17 public choice the-
ory predicts that groups will tend to organize politically more often when
they are small and well-defined, and when they are seeking concentrated ben-
efits (such as subsidies) or opposing concentrated costs (such as special taxes
or user fees). Groups will not organize as often to seek or oppose legislation
that distributes benefits to the general population or is paid for generally.
Much of the legislative agenda is dictated by the formation and activity of
interest groups.
Baseball club owners are a small, well-organized group intensely interested
in preserving their exemption from antitrust law and can be expected to
lobby hard against any proposal to overturn Flood v. Kuhn. Those primarily
hurt by the sport's exemption are the millions of spectators who buy tickets
(and, arguably, pay higher prices because of the owners' cooperative behav-
ior). We are largely ignorant of any injury we have suffered and are, in any
event, unlikely to organize politically because whatever harm we have suf-
fered individually is quite small. Baseball players were harmed by the re-
serve clause throught the 1960s, but like consumers they were not politically
well organized until 1966.218 On the other hand, the owners in other profes-
216. Professional baseball took the position in Food that the forum for remedying problems with
the reserve clause was labor arbitration, rather than Congress or the courts.
217. The model described here is taken from my synthesis in earlier articles. Eskridge, supra
note 199, at 1518-19; Eskridge, Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275 (1988). I agree, however, with Farber & Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873 (1987), that we should be cautious about
applying public choice models and should accept them as hypotheses and not proven data.
218. The Major League Players Association was formed in 1954, but it did not become a major
force until after 1966. It sponsored the F/ood litigation, for example. Players were not better organ-
ized, in part because there were so many of them and (I suspect) in part because they had substan-
tially more allegiance to their teams (and hence to the owners of their teams) than to the interest
group before the 1960s. In the 1970s the players became better organized and were able to elimi-
nate the reserve clause and other anticompetitive restrictions through arbitration and collective
bargaining. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRicKEY, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 303-
04 note h (1987).
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sional sports, such as football, are also likely to be politically well-organized
and mighi be expected to press for legislation expanding the antitrust exemp-
tion to other professional sports, as indeed they did. That Congress, even
under continuous special interest pressure, refused to expand baseball's ex-
emption to other sports is persuasive evidence that the deliberative proce-
dures of Congress were "working," and rebuffed the demands of the special
interest groups. In my view, this history on the whole supports cancellation
of the exemption by the Court that blunderingly created it.
The final line of defense for the acquiescence argument in Flood v. Kuhn is.
that a controversial political decision like removing baseball's antitrust ex-
emption ought to be made by Congress. 219 This is, of course, a return to the
leave-it-to-the-legislature argument and illustrates the somewhat fanciful na-
ture of that argument in cases like Flood. The Court's decision in Toolson
was itself controversial; to justify the preservation of Toolson in order to
avoid further controversy, all of which is attributable to the Court's original
mistake, is insanity.
The legitimacy of our government is not enhanced by leaving these sorts of
controversial decisions to Congress, for it is very hard for Congress to change
the status quo, especially when the status quo is defined by an authoritative
judicial decision that arguably creates reliance interests. Our political organs
are much more reluctant to take away entitlements than to grant new ones, a
tendency greatly exacerbated by the "dilemma of the ungrateful electo-
rate. '220 According to this theory, the things an elected representative does
for interest groups will be remembered and felt much less strongly than the
things she does to penalize those groups. Yet most legislators are regularly
reelected. Legislators accomplish this trick by refusing to make political
choices harming important interest groups. Legislators will do almost any-
thing to avoid making hard political choices, and Congress' decade of grap-
pling with the immunity issue illustrates the operation of this avoidance.
When hard political choices must be made, legislators prefer to draft general
statutes and leave the specific decisions to someone else, mainly judges and
administrators. Most legislators would have been perfectly happy for the
Court to have overruled Federal Baseball (preferably prospectively). Base-
ball owners would have objected, but legislators could have deferred to the
Court (a perfect avoidance strategy) and perhaps even legislated some relief
concerning the reserve clause. Hence, the Court in Toolson and Flood v.
219. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 213, at 1348-80 (reviewing Dean Levi's notion that
controversial decisions properly belong with legislature); Levi, supra note 12, at 521-25, 538-40
(legislature should make controversial decisions because it is responsible to people and because
courts are normally timid).
220. See Eskridge, supra note 217, at 288-89.
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Kuhn was doing Congress no favor when it dumped the baseball exemption
back into the legislative lap.
A third perspective, political decisionmaking theory, supports my skepti-
cism about the meaning of legislative inaction and suggests that the Court's
adherence to ridiculously incoherent statutory precedents may in fact disrupt
the legislative process. Political scientist John Kingdon posits that Congress
is an "organized anarchy" whose deliberations are best characterized by the
theory of "garbage can decisionmaking. '221 Congress is an organized anar-
chy because it enjoys fluid participation in decisionmaking, works haphaz-
ardly by trial and error, and does not operate according to fixed and rigid
substantive preferences. In such an anarchy, there will not be linear and
rational decisionmaking, but the legislative agenda will be quite limited be-
cause the deliberative energy of its participants is limited. Salient concerns of
national policy, proposals to deal with those concerns, and political opportu-
nities to do something will coexist as separate streams in the "garbage can."
Public policy will typically be made when the streams fortuitously come to-
gether: A concern is recognized as salient, a well-considered solution is
available that fits in with current thinking about other arenas of policy, and
the political climate is ripe for change (the change fits in with the agendas of
important participants in the process, and constraints do not inhibit action).
Garbage can decisionmaking gives us little confidence that the Supreme
Court's shuttling a problem of statutory interpretation back to Congress will
result in any serious consideration of the issue. In many cases, the Court's
decision will not make the issue salient enough to find a place on the legisla-
tive agenda, and even when the issue is salient (as the baseball immunity
issue has been) nothing will be done unless there is a well-considered propo-
sal that fits in with the drift of public thinking and the personal agendas of
important participants. Moreover, the garbage can model suggests that the
legislative agenda is not infinitely elastic. The insertion of one issue into the
agenda crowds out other issues. Is it desirable for the Court to add to the
clutter? The issue of baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws is a worst
case for such an addition: The issue is at bottom trivial, yet it is so contro-
versial that it is bound to command legislative attention, especially in light of
the patent "illogic" of the exemption. 222
221. J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 47-73 (1984). The model
is drawn from Cohen, March & Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN.
Sci. Q. 1 (Mar. 1972), and is described in W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 218, at 59-61.
222. Thus, I think that if the Court had simply overruled Federal Baseball when it had a chance
to do so in Toolson, the matter would have effectively been removed from the legislative agenda. A
few bills probably would have been introduced, and perhaps some relief legislated in connection
with the reserve clause, but given a strong statement by the Court and the obvious correctness of the
overruling (especially if it were made prospective only) I doubt that the matter would have lasted
long on the legislative agenda.
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In conclusion, none of the traditional arguments for the super-strong pre-
sumption against overruling statutory precedents is persuasive in Flood,
which is a strong case for the legislative acquiescence argument. Normal
stare decisis concerns, chiefly baseball's reliance on the antitrust immunity,
still made Flood a difficult case. The Court could have-and can still-over-
rule Federal Baseball prospectively, with a transition period if necessary.
III. APPLYING THE EVOLUTIvE APPROACH TO OVERRULING
STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
The super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents is
rhetoric that the Supreme Court ought to discard. It has become riddled with
exceptions and is only selectively followed, and it rests upon either a con-
fused formalism or a naive view of the political process. In my view, statu-
tory precedents are entitled only to normal stare decisis effect. Thus, the
Supreme Court can overrule them if they are clearly wrong, produce bad
policy consequences, and have not generated an undue amount of public and
private reliance.
Although this evolutive approach is not dictated by existing Supreme
Court doctrine, it is directly inspired by some of the Court's statutory deci-
sions, especially Boys Markets and other decisions between 1961 and 1972,
when the super-strong presumption was in temporary eclipse. Thus, the
evolutive approach would merely be a return to the Court's traditional stare
decisis analysis. Indeed, I agree with most of the results reached by the
Court, for normal stare decisis principles are most deferential to precedents'.
For example, I agree with the Court's refusal to overrule Weber, for utterly
standard stare decisis reasons. These reasons are explored in the first section
of this part. On the other hand, for the reasons explored in part II, I think
Toolson and Flood v. Kuhn were wrongly decided. The second section of this
part analyzes another recent Sherman Act case and argues that the Court
should have overruled this equally antique precedent, at least prospectively.
The third section of this part examines the Supreme Court's recent overrul-
ing of the so-called Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, which permitted immediate ap-
peal of stays pending arbitration, and points to this case as a good example of
the evolutive approach proposed in this article.
A. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
Return to the case with which this article started. Justice Scalia's dissent-
ing opinion in Johnson argued that Weber should be overruled, thereby ren-
dering voluntary affirmative action plans violative of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Court's main defense of Weber was its assertion in a
footnote that "Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construc-
tion, nor have any such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore
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may assume that our interpretation was correct. '223 This is a fallacious argu-
ment, for the legal process reasons suggested in part II, and in Justice Scalia's
dissent. Any argument from legislative inaction is subject to the objection
that it is hard to "assert with any degree of assurance that congressional
failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2)
inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the
status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political
cowardice. '224
The Johnson majority responded that legislative inattention was not a
plausible explanation for the congressional inaction, since Weber was a
widely publicized, controversial decision.225 Indeed, the majority argued,
Congress responded to the Court's equally controversial decision in General
Electric v. Gilbert,22 6 which held that title VII did not apply to an employer's
failure to provide pregnancy benefits, by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act of 1978,227 which provides that refusal to provide pregnancy benefits
can be unlawful discrimination under title VII. "Surely," the majority con-
cluded, "it is appropriate to find some probative value in such radically dif-
ferent Congressional reactions to this court's interpretations of the same
statute."228
Not surely. Not even necessarily. Recall the legislative response to Tool-
son. The Court's decision stimulated congressional interest, not to overrule
the outdated baseball exemption, but to expand it, because owners of profes-
sional athletic teams in baseball and other sports were better organized than
players and consumers. Gilbert and Weber reveal a similar phenomenon.
Gilbert's holding was swiftly overturned, in large part because organized wo-
men's groups made it an important item on the legislative agenda. Weber's
holding was not the object of serious legislative efforts at overruling, in large
223. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451 n.7.
224. Id at 1473 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also argued that the Court relied upon "the
patently false premise that the correctness of statutory construction is to be measured by what the
current Congress desires, rather than by what the law as enacted meant." Id. at 1472-73. This is an
oversimplification of what statutory interpretation involves, as shown in my discussion in Eskridge,
supra note 199. Finally, Justice Scalia argued that Johnson, in which the Court relied on congres-
sional inaction as a basis for not overruling a precedent, is inconsistent with Monell, where the
Court was willing to overrule a statutory precedent which had existed through 17 years of congres-
sional inaction. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1473. This argument makes the commendable point that the
Court's practice has been inconsistent, but Johnson and Monell are arguably different. In the for-
mer case, not a single bill had been introduced to overrule Weber, and congressional discussion had
not been unfriendly. In the latter case, there had been substantial congressional criticism of
Monroe, and some legislative action seemed to assume that Monroe was wrong. See supra notes
108-22 and accompanying text.
225. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451 n.7.
226. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
228. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451 n.7
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part because the Brian Webers constitute a diffuse, unaffluent group that is
unlikely to be organized, and because well-organized groups such as unions
and employers are on the whole not opposed to the Weber result, and well-
organized minority groups (especially blacks and women) are intensely op-
posed to any modification of Weber. A Congress attentive to the dilemma of
the ungrateful electorate is not likely to take up this issue, and in fact it has
not. Not only is Congress' inaction easily comprehensible, but it is deeply
troubling, because the people hurt by affirmative action recieve no meaning-
ful hearing in the legislative process. As Justice Scalia argued in dissent,
affirmative action may be an example of cost-shifting by well-organized
groups (unions and employers) to unorganized groups (Brian Weber and
Paul Johnson). 229
In short, Johnson's legislative inaction argument is only the most recent
example of how the super-strong presumption against overruling statutory
precedents can obscure analysis. The question remains: should Weber be
overruled under the evolutive approach urged here? Justice Scalia made
three different arguments for overruling the precedent. I find each of the
arguments incompletely persuasive and agree, for traditional stare decisis
reasons, with the Court's refusal to overrule Weber.
To begin with, Justice Scalia argued that it is "'beyond doubt.., that
[Weber] misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision.' "230 The
controlling provision is section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits "discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '231 Justice Scalia
found the language of the statute "unambiguous" in its prohibition of an
employer's discrimination against white male employees in order to redress
racial or sexual imbalances in the employer's workforce or selected parts of
it. This is the same argument originally made in the Weber dissent, and it is
made no more persuasively by Justice Scalia.
What, indeed, does it mean to "discriminate" under title VII? It can mean
to make any "distinction" based upon race or sex, and that is the meaning
Justice Scalia contends is the only meaning the word can have. Yet "dis-
criminate" can also mean to make distinctions based upon prejudice, stereo-
types, or other invidious reasons. To deny Paul Johnson a job because the
employer hates whites or males or believes invalid stereotypes about white
males is to discriminate under this second definition. To deny Johnson the
229. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1475-76.
230. Id at 1474 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Weber also involved § 703(d), which relates to training
programs.
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job because the employer is seeking over time to achieve greater balance in
the workforce and to undo some of the ill effects of racial or sexual stereo-
types is not the same thing. Nothing in section 703(a) suggests that Justice
Scalia's definition is the most likely definition, let alone the only possible
one.
2 3 2
Justice Scalia mentioned but declined to rely on the legislative history of
title VII. Rather, his second argument is that Weber was a sharp departure
from previous Supreme Court interpretations of title VII and has introduced
"instability and unpredictable expansion" into the law of employment dis-
crimination.233 This charge is, on the whole, not supported by the evolution
of title VII.
The validation of affirmative action in Weber can be viewed in part as a
practical judicial response to our nation's experience with title VII in its first
fifteen years.234 The original legislative expectation (in 1964) was that once
invidious discrimination was eliminated, blacks and women and other ex-
cluded groups would assume their proportionate places throughout the
workforce. This did not occur, in part because discrimination became more
covert and in part because of underlying stereotypes. These residual forms of
discrimination were harder to root out than open bigotry had been. The
Supreme Court's response, in such cases as Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,235 was
to emphasize the idea that results matter. "The Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimina-
tory in operation.... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. '236
After Griggs, employers and unions faced potential title VII liability if the
percentage of women and minorities in their workforces remained unusually
low. Potential defendants could prove their good faith and rectify some of
the past discrimination through voluntary affirmative action. Indeed, the
Supreme Court several times in the 1970s encouraged voluntary remedies to
ameliorate the effects of past discrimination. 237 While the Weber situation
was not specifically addressed by the Court, the drift of its opinions was ap-
parent. And in University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke,238 a ma-
232. As I argued in Eskridge, supra note 199, at 1489-90, other provisions in title VII provide
arguments for and against Justice Scalia's understanding of "discriminate." On the whole, I do not
find the text of title VII clear one way or the other.
233. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1473-74 (Scalia J., dissenting).
234. The argument in this paragraph is made at greater length in Eskridge, supra note 199, at
1492-94.
235. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
236. Id. at 431-32 (emphasis in original).
237. Examples include Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778-79 (1976); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
238. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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jority of the Court dealt with the affirmative action issue in the context of
title VI of the Act, holding that a public agency could under certain circum-
stances follow a policy of racial preferences.
Weber went further than the Court's prior cases interpreting title VII, and
as interpreted in Johnson it goes further to validate affirmative action pro-
grams under title VII than would be permissible under title VI. 239 Yet the
history does not justify Justice Scalia's assertion that Weber was a "dramatic
departure from the Court's prior Title VII precedents," nor do the post-
Weber developments support his suggestion that the decision "has provided
little guidance to persons seeking to conform their conduct to the law."
240
Indeed, as Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Johnson emphasized, 241
Weber has become the basis for a series of Supreme Court decisions permit-
ting affimative action plans in a variety of settings. 242 These cases have not
given clean-cut guidelines (as Justice Scalia correctly observed), but they
have provided guidance. To overrule Weber would cast that guidance into
doubt and require the Court to reconsider these other cases as well.
Justice Scalia's third argument is that Weber, Bakke, and Johnson consti-
tute a "line of decisions rooted so firmly in naivete" that they all "must be
wrong. ' 243 In each case, the Court held that certain voluntary affirmative
action plans are permissible as long as they do not establish hard-and-fast
quotas over time. Yet in practice, Justice Scalia argued, such voluntary plans
become assurances that white males (typically in blue collar positions) will
not be seriously considered if there is any "minimally qualified" minority
applicant. Effectively, this reintroduces invidious discrimination based upon
race and sex. Moreover, given the incentive to produce good numbers be-
cause of potential Griggs lawsuits and pressure from government contracting
agencies, employers will feel required to practice such discrimination. "A
statute designed to establish a color-blind and gender-blind workplace has
thus been converted into a powerful engine of racism and sexism, not merely
permitting intentional race- and sex-based discrimination, but often making
it, through operation of the legal system, practically compelled."
'244
This is Justice Scalia's best argument, but while he confidently lampooned
239. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1447-48 n.6. Johnson probably did not have to interpret the Weber
precedent so broadly to reach this result. Id at 1460-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
240. Id. at 1473-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 1457-60 (Stevens, J., concurring).
242. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3053 (1986)
(upholding affirmative action program for union and apprenticeship programs); Firefighters v. City
of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3073 (1986) (upholding consent decree permitting voluntary, race-
conscious affimative action such as was permissible in Weber).
243. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1474 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. Id at 1475 (emphasis in original).
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the majority for naivete, he provided no empirical support for his vision of
employer conduct. And under the facts of Weber and Johnson, Justice
Scalia's concern for white male employees must be met by concern for blacks
who could not become craft employees because they did not have the em-
ployment history prerequisites (Weber), and for female employees who had
traditionally been discouraged from applying for a position described in sex-
ist terms (Johnson). Yet employers will probably often follow the path of
least resistance and create criteria that are de facto racist and sexist.
Still, this concern is an insufficient reason to overrule Weber. Instead, Jus-
tice Scalia's appeal to justice best supports the position taken by Justice
O'Connor's opinion concurring in the Johnson judgment. Justice O'Connor
interpreted Weber as a balance between the desire for color blind employ-
ment decisions and the need for elimination of the lasting effects of discrimi-
nation against minorities. The balance permitted affirmative action "only as
a remedial device to eliminate actual or apparent discrimination. '245 She
agreed with the Court that Weber should not be overruled, but she urged
that the precedent not be expanded to permit virtually any voluntary affirma-
tive action plan, as the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens suggested. Jus-
tice O'Connor's limiting principle, drawn from recent constitutional
precedents for public employers, is that societal discrimination, standing
alone, does not justify an open-ended system of racial or sexual quotas, but
that a statistical imbalance sufficient to establish a prima facie case of title
VII discrimination will suffice.246
Whatever one's position on Justice O'Connor's exact test for evaluating
affirmative action plans by public employers, her approach to precedents is
the one most consistent with the evolutive approach outlined in the article.
Unlike the Johnson dissenters, Justice O'Connor was sensitive to the direc-
tion staked out by the Court's precedents and would not lightly disturb the
values and expectations expressed in them. Unlike the majority Justices, she
did not dismiss the problems of justice presented by Weber and declined to
expand the precedent beyond the needs of the particular case. In short,
Weber should not have been overruled. Nor should it have been unnecessa-
rily expanded.
B. ANTITRUST DAMAGES CASES
The plaintiff shipper of excelsior and flax in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwest-
ern Railway247 sued the railroad carrier defendant under the Sherman Act
for participating in a conspiracy to fix rates. The challenged rates had been
245. Id at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
246. Id. at 1461-63 (relying on Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1856 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
247. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
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filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and challenged by
Keogh and other shippers, but the ICC had upheld them as "reasonable"
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act. A unanimous Supreme Court
held that even though the Interstate Commerce Act does not immunize regu-
lated carriers from government antitrust prosecutions, it does immunize car-
riers from private treble damages liability. The Court gave three reasons for
its holding: (1) The rates filed with and accepted by the ICC are the "legal"
rates. It would be anomalous to impute to Congress an intent that carriers
could be sued for price-fixing when they were only charging the rates re-
quired by law.248 (2) If Keogh were to prevail, he would receive a lower rate
denied other shippers, akin to an unlawful discriminatory "rebate." 249 (3)
To establish his injury, Keogh would have to prove a "hypothetical" lower
rate (in the absence of the price-fixing) and its acceptability to the ICC. Ad-
ditionally, Keogh would have to prove that it, and not other shippers or the
ultimate consumer, would have received the benefit of the hypothetical lower
rate. These problems rendered the damage calculation too speculative.
250
More than half a century later, Judge Henry Friendly suggested, in Square
D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau,251 that Keogh should be reconsid-
ered, because "many of [its] arguments do not seem so compelling today as
they did in 1922."252 The United States urged the Supreme Court to follow
Judge Friendly's suggestion, and the Court accepted the case on certiorari.
Upon reconsideration of Keogh, the Court declined to overrule the statutory
precedent, citing the super-strong presumption against overruling statutory
precedents and Congress' reliance on the precedent as it revised the Inter-
state Commerce Act in this century. 253
Under an evolutive approach to statutory precedents, Keogh should have
been overruled in part. Judge Friendly's scholarly opinion following Keogh
but suggesting that it be overruled is a model of the evolutive approach.
Judge Friendly carefully demonstrated that each of the reasons given for the
Keogh holding has become obsolete because of changes in law and society,
and I concur with his analysis. The analysis here has a broader focus, be-
cause Judge Friendly analyzed the technical issues so carefully. Three devel-
opments in antitrust and railroad policy over the last fifty years not only
248. Id. at 162-63.
249. Id. at 163.
250. Id at 164.
251. 760 F.2d 1347 (2d Cir. 1985) (following Keogh but suggesting it should be overrulel), aff'd,
106 S. Ct. 1922 (1986).
252. Id at 1352. Square D was a case involving motor carriers rather than rail carriers, but
Keogh was fully applicable, because the legal principles regulating rail and motor carriers are paral-
lel. In this section, my arguments refer only to rail carriers, but similar points can be made for
motor carriers.
253. 106 S. Ct. 1922, 1928-31 (1986).
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render Keogh analytically obsolete, but indicate that its injustice is substan-
tial enough to overcome the normal stare decisis presumption of correctness.
The most important legal change since Keogh has been the development of
the Sherman Act through common law trial and error, working out practical
problems and creating workable legal rules. For example, early reluctance,
manifested in Keogh, to award damages that are in some way speculative has
given way to the Court's recognition that "[d]ifficulty of ascertainment is not
long confused with right of recovery. '254 Thus, some of the problems impli-
cated in Keogh have been resolved over time. The central problem in Ke-
ogh-how to integrate the Sherman Act's policy with the policies of various
regulatory regimes-has been a central feature of the Sherman Act's statu-
tory evolution.
The Sherman Act's first interaction with another statutory scheme was its
interaction with the Interstate Commerce Act. Not surprisingly, the Court
proceeded unevenly. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Associa-
tion,255 the Court upheld a government Sherman Act prosecution against
carrier price-fixing; the Court rejected arguments that such prices should be
left to the ICC's regulation.256 Keogh was, of course, a retreat from the ap-
proach of Trans-Missouri and reflected the expanded ratemaking authority
given to the ICC by subsequent amendments to the Interstate Commerce
Act.
The Trans-Missouri/Keogh line of cases represents the Supreme Court's
first, clumsy, attempt to integrate the Sherman Act and a regulatory statute.
In the next fifty years, the Court developed a more sophisticated approach,
giving more emphasis to antitrust policy. Since the early 1960s, the Court
has warned that implied immunity from antitrust treble actions should be
allowed only where there is a "plain repugnancy" between such damages
action and the regulatory scheme.257 In industries in which rates are filed
with an agency other than the ICC, courts have not created an implied im-
munity from antitrust damage actions, though they have sought to protect
254. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1931) (quot-
ing Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 F. 791, 802 (2d Cir. 1924)). Modem Sherman Act case
law utterly rejects the Keogh arguments that treble damages should be refused because plaintiff will
not be able to prove market price with precision, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S, 100, 123-25 (1969), or because plaintiff may have "passed on" the higher rates to its own
customers. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-94 (1968); see
Square D, 760 F.2d at 1353 (Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to recover damages passed on to
consumers).
255. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
256. Id at 312-26; see United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (similarity be-
tween agreement at issue and agreement in Trans-Missouri requires that similar result be reached).
257. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); see Gordon v. New
York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 683 (1973) (implied immunity created only if necessary to make
statutory scheme work, and then only to minimum extent necessary).
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the regulatory scheme through deferential procedures. A leading case is Car-
nation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference. 258 Carnation, a shipper, alleged
that an association of carriers by water had conspired to fix shipping rates.
The conference (relying on Keogh) responded that the Shipping Act immu-
nized them from such actions, and that only the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion (FMC) had authority to consider complaints about the filed rates. The
Supreme Court held that the best way to protect the statutory scheme was
not to create a broad immunity from antitrust lawsuits, but instead to require
the antitrust action to be stayed pending referral to the FMC to determine
whether the challenged conduct was unlawful under the Shipping Act.25 9
Under the Carnation principle, the best way to accommodate a regulatory
scheme such as the Interstate Commerce Act is through deference to the
primary jurisdiction of the agency, not through an implied antitrust immu-
nity.260 Thus, Keogh was, in retrospect, quite wrong in assuming that Sher-
man Act damages liability would clash directly with the ICC's jurisdiction
over rates, and that courts could not easily obtain an ICC advisory opinion
on whether an antitrust plaintiff's hypothetical market rate would pass mus-
ter under the Interstate Commerce Act. Indeed, courts since Keogh have fre-
quently referred rate issues to the ICC for such advisory opinions.261 More
important, the Carnation principle suggests that antitrust immunity might be
adopted only if treble damages actions would invade the ICC's own authority
to regulate similar conduct.
This introduces a second major change after Keogh: disappointment in the
ability of the ICC to regulate price-fixing and related anticompetitive con-
duct. Keogh involved rates filed with the ICC and subject to hearings to
determine their validity; an assumption of the decision was that those rates
were the "best" possible rates, given the regulatory objectives. This view of
ICC ratemaking has eroded over time. For one thing, the number of rate
filings with the ICC has increased 1200% since Keogh, without a correspond-
ing increase in ICC resources. Of the 1,200,000 filings in 1983, the ICC ex-
amined only 188, resulting in suspension of only 11 filed rates.262 In
addition, the agency now recognizes that there is no single "legal" rate; in-
stead, there is a "range of reasonableness." This obviously leaves considera-
258. 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
259. Id at 222-24.
260. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081, 1101-05 (7th Cir.)
(Communications Act does not entitle AT&T to implied antitrust exemption), cert denied, 464 U.S.
891 (1983); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 929 (2d Cir. 1981)
(supervision by regulatory body does not provide immunity against all antitrust claims).
261. See Square D, 760 F.2d at 1352-53 (citing cases).
262. These figures were cited by the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 13 & n.14, Square D (No. 85-2 1), and were not disputed by any of the parties or amici
in the Square D case.
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ble room for carriers to fix rates so that they consistently fall at the top of the
range. The ICC is not equipped to regulate this sort of conduct, as the
agency. candidly admitted in the Square D case.
The agency is, however, charged with regulating carrier "rate bureaus."
Pursuant to the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948,263 carriers can, with the ap-
proval of the ICC, form joint associations to discuss rates. Congress and the
ICC believed that some collective price-fixing is necessary in the railroad and
trucking industry because of the complexity and interconnectedness of their
rate structures.264 For example, one carrier may offer service from point A to
point C but must pay a second carrier for the transfer of the goods from
point B to point C, in order for the first carrier to set its rates, it needs to
know the second carrier's rates. Thus Congress contemplated that carriers
could agree to discuss rates collectively, but only to the extent allowed by the
rate agreement submitted to and approved by the ICC and only if such dis-
cussions did not discourage "independent action" by carriers to depart from
agreed-upon rates.265 So long as the carriers act within their rate agreement,
they are immune from antitrust liability, under the Reed-Bulwinkle Act.
The shippers in Square D relied on the Reed-Bulwinkle Act to argue that
Congress had overruled Keogh by replacing the decision with a more pre-
cisely drawn statutory immunity.266 That argument is untenable, because the
legislative history indicates no desire to change then-existing antitrust princi-
ples applicable to the railroad and motor carrier industries. 267 The signifi-
cance of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act is the extent to which collective ratemaking
itself seems to have been the occasion for secret anticompetitive conduct in
blatant violation of both the antitrust laws and the rate agreements.268 The
Square D case itself may be typical of what has been going on in some of
these rate bureaus for more than three decades. The plaintiff shippers alleged
that the carrier rate bureau ignored the notice, publication, public hearing,
and record-keeping requirements of its rate agreement and set rates secretly
through a "Principals Committee" from 1966 to 1981.269 Secret price-fixing
and collective boycotting of carriers exercising their independent action
263. Pub. L. No. 80-662, 62 Stat. 472 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (1982)).
264. H.R. REP. No. 1100, 80th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEWS 1844, 1845, 1849.
265. Id, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS at 1854-55.
266. Square D, 106 S. Ct. at 1927.
267. See Square D, 760 F.2d at 1356-60 (excellent examination of legislative history of Reed-
Bulwinkle Act).
268. The allegations in Square D were the same as those in a complaint filed by the United States,
which resulted in a consent decree. United States v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 1984-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 66,167 (W.D.N.Y 1984); see also United States v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R., 717
F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 859
(N.D. Ohio 1983).
269. See Petition for Certiorari at 2-7, Square D (No. 85-21).
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rights allegedly was not unusual in the 1960s and 1970s, yet the ICC was
apparently unaware of such activity, until government and private antitrust
lawsuits alerted the nation to the problem.
Dissatisfaction with the ICC's overall performance led to the enactment of
legislation substantially deregulating rail and motor transportation in 1980.270
The legislation endorsed greater competition as the best way for the trans-
portation industry to develop. This has been accomplished, first, by circum-
scribing the immunity for and activity of rate bureaus 271 and, second, by
substantially removing the ICC from rate-setting. The old provisions for
tariff filing and reasonableness determination are removed for railroads when
there is a shipper contract on file with the ICC272 or when the ICC has ex-
empted the carrier by administrative regulation. 273 The ICC still retains a
fair amount of potential power to review rates, as in areas where it finds
"market dominance." 274 The 1980 statutes did not overrule Keogh, but they
decisively undermine its central rationale. Most shippers in Keogh's position
today have no real remedy before the ICC.275
The growing dissatisfaction with the ICC's enforcement of its statutory
duties is an illustration of a third major change in public policy after Keogh:
acceptance of private enforcement of public rights. The idea implicitly ac-
cepted in Keogh is that public rights are only enforced by the government,
either through the ICC in rate proceedings or the Department of Justice in
antitrust proceedings. Unless Congress says otherwise, such a scheme of
public enforcement precludes private lawsuits, for they would presumptively
disrupt the statutory scheme. This central idea has been discredited from
two different directions.
First, the legal culture today is more skeptical of the ability of agencies to
serve the public interest. Keogh's position, vesting faith in the ICC, was in
the 1920s the progressive position; after some hostility to the idea of adminis-
trative adjudication of rights earlier in the history of the ICC, the Supreme
Court in the 1920s was finally giving the agency breathing room to grow and
270. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448. 94 Stat. 1897 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
271. Section 10706 of the recodified Interstate Commerce Act is a much more detailed specifica-
tion for ICC regulation of rate bureaus. It gives the ICC express power to require reports from the
bureaus, 49 U.S.C. § 10706(e) (1982), and to review its approval of rate agreements. Ia § 10706(f)-
(g). Indeed, the ICC is now required to review each agreement no less than once every three years,
to determine whether it is operating successfuly and in the public interest. Id § 10706(h). More-
over, the 1980 amendments explicitly limit the activities of rate bureaus. Id § 10706 (a)(3), (b)(3).
272. Id § 10713.
273. Id § 10505; 49 C.F.R. § 1039 (1987).
274. 49 U.S.C. § 10701a (1982).
275. Kahn, Keogh's Kaput, 49 ICC PRAc. J. 478, 487 (1982).
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develop. 276 The ICC was perceived in the 1920s as a vigorous, public-
minded agency, but the evidence recounted above suggests that this has not
been the case for some time. Indeed, Professor Bernstein's celebrated model
of the "life cycle of an independent commission" found the ICC to be well
into the process of "devitalization" in the 1950s. 277 He would probably have
found it all but moribund in the 1970s. Bernstein attributed the process of
devitalization to the agency's loss of its original political support, the adop-
tion of routines to the detriment of creativity, and the formation of ossifying
ties with the regulated entities. 278 Later literature detailing the process of
"agency capture" draws upon the basic life cycle model, and economists and
legal scholars have persuasively argued that the systemic problems with
agency regulation justify greater reliance on private enforcement through
lawsuits resolved in courts. 279
Second, the legal culture is better aware of the ability of private lawsuits to
protect the public interest. Class actions, for instance, permit adjudication of
the rights of the entire group and often vindicate rights that would otherwise
not be litigated because each individual's stake is too small, or most victims
are unaware of their rights This undermines Keogh's assumption that recov-
ery by shippers would act as a discriminatory rebate; if the shipper brings a
class action, as in Square D, all victims will share fairly in the recovery. The
progressive literature defending the expansion of class actions has a broader
message as well. The monetary incentives accruing from large scale recov-
eries may be the most effective way to enforce public policies.280
This sketchy history of legal and societal developments since 1922 suggests
that Keogh no longer fits our legal culture; it has produced the abuses perpe-
trated under the guise of rate bureaus in the last several decades. Judge
Friendly's opinion carefully demonstrated that the analytical underpinnings
of Keogh have dissipated. My analysis suggests that Keogh helped perpetrate
indefensible trade activities and has become seriously obsolescent.
Why, then, did Square D refuse Judge Friendly's suggestion to overrule
Keogh? Apart from the inertial force of the super-strong presumption
against overruling statutory precedents, the main reason was probably a de-
sire to protect reliance interests. The conduct challenged in Square D oc-
276. See generally Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189
(1986).
277. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74-95 (1955).
278. Ia at 90-91.
279. See generally Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CI. L. REv. 47 (1969).
280. See generally Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of En-
forcers, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1974); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEG.
STUD. 1 (1975). But see Breit & Alzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The
Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1974) (private treble damages remedy leads
to overenforcement).
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curred before 1981,281 at a time when railroad and motor carrier rate bureaus
had enjoyed decades of largely unquestioned Keogh and Reed-Bulwinkle im-
munity from antitrust treble damage actions. Had Square D overruled Ke-
ogh, dozens of lawsuits against past railroad and/or truck conspiracies might
have followed, a result arguably unfair and contrary to public policy given
the substantial changes in rate bureau activity required by the 1980 reforms.
The Court could have dealt with this problem by overruling its statutory
precedent prospectively.282 The Court also could have overruled Keogh ret-
roactively back to 1981, when the 1980 amendments became fully operative.
While the amendments themselves did not overrule Keogh, they rendered its
policy obsolete, and alerted the industry that Keogh could no longer be relied
on as in the past.283 At the very least, Keogh should be overruled for any
rate-setting that is not nominally monitored by the ICC.
C. CASES ALLOWING IMMEDIATE APPEAL OF EQUITABLE STAYS
Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co. 284 was a diversity suit at law, seek-
ing damages under a life insurance policy. The insurance company pleaded
an equitable affirmative defense and moved for trial on this defense by the
judge, before the jury trial on the contract claims. The judge granted the
motion, and the claimant filed an immediate appeal. Normally, federal
courts will only hear an appeal of a "final" order.285 However, the Supreme
Court in 1935 held applicable section 129 of the Judicial Code, 286 which per-
mitted immediate appeal of interlocutory orders constituting an exercise of
equitable jurisdiction granting or refusing injunctions. Although section 129
did not permit appeals of orders granting or denying ordinary stays, Enelow
held that the order was the functional equivalent of an injunction. Even
though the judge issuing the equitable order was the same judge who would
be conducting the law trial, the Court analogized the procedure to that fol-
lowed by equity courts enjoining proceedings at law.287 In a companion case,
the Court held that the Enelow rule also supported an immediate appeal of a
281. Square D, 760 F.2d at 1360 n.7.
282. See United States v. Estate of Donneley, 397 U.S. 286, 295 (1970) ("In rare cases, decisions
construing federal cases might be denied full retroactive effect, as for instance when this Court
overrules its own construction of a statute."); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964)
(reserving possibility of prospective overruling); R. DICKERsON, supra note 12, at 257-5 8 (favoring
prospective application in many cases in which statutory precedents are overruled). The option of a
prospective overruling was presented to the Court in Square D. Brief for the Association of Ameri-
can Railroads as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29-30, Square D (No. 85-21).
283. Commentary in the leading ICC practice journal made this very point. See Kahn, supra
note 275, at 483-85.
284. 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
285. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
286. 28 U.S.C. § 227, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1) (1982).
287. Enelow, 293 U.S. at 382-83.
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stay of an action at law in order to enforce an agreement to arbitrate a con-
tractual dispute.288
The artificial, arguably strained, reasoning of Enelow might well have been
abandoned once the Court merged law and equity three years later through
its adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No longer did the same
federal judge have to pretend to be a law judge for part of a case like Enelow,
and a chancellor in equity for the other. Under rule 2, the judge performed
both functions wearing the same hat. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court in
Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.28 9 held that the Enelow doctrine
survived the Federal Rules' merger of law and equity and that plaintiffs were
in no different position than if a state equity court had restrained them from
proceeding in a law action.290 In City of Morgantown v. Royal Insurance
Co.291 the Court refused to extend Enelow to render stays of equitable law-
suits immediately appealable, noting here the merger of law and equity in the
Federal Rules and the general policy of avoiding piecemeal appeals. 292
The Supreme Court in 1955 expressed some concern about the arbitrary
nature of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, but declined at that time to overrule
it.293 Lower court judges and commentators have subjected the doctrine to
increasingly outraged criticism, especially in this decade.294 It has been
termed "an historical anomaly, '295 a "Serbonian bog,"'296 and a "medieval"
rule297 by circuit courts applying the doctrine. In 1987, Judge Richard Pos-
ner analyzed the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine in a most scholarly opinion that is
a classic example of the evolutive approach I urge for the Court to apply in
288. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935).
289. 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
290. Id. at 191-92.
291. 337 U.S. 254 (1949).
292. The Court stated that it "would ill serve the stated purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure
were we to perpetuate by analogy distinctions which the rules expressly disavow." Id. at 258. Jus-
tice Black in dissent predicted (wrongly, in retrospect) that Morgantown could not logically be
cabined to equitable proceedings and that its reasoning overruled Enelow and Ettelson sub silentio.
Id. at 261-63.
293. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1955), cricitized Enelow-
Etteleson as arbitrary and archaic but declined to overrule it because "the distinction has been
applied for years," and Congress ought to solve the problem. See Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad-
casting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480-81 & 481 n.8 (1978) (holding Enelow-Ettelson doctrine inapplicable
to order denying class certification).
294. Every circuit (excepting the new Federal Circuit) has criticized the Enelow-Ettelson doc-
trine, Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 1986), and the
academic commentators have long criticized the doctrine as worthless and counterproductive. E.g.,
9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.20[3], at 245 (2d ed. 1985); 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E.
COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3923 (1977); Mathy, The Ap-
pealability of District Court Orders Staying Court Proceedings Pending Arbitration, 63 MARQ. L.
REv. 31 (1979).
295. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 1979).
296. Hartford Fin. Sys. v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 712 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 1983).
297. Mar-Len of La., Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane, 732 F.2d 444, 445 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 76:13611422
HeinOnline  -- 76 Geo. L. J. 1422 1987-1988
OVERRULING STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
reconsidering statutory precedents.298 In Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp.,299 decided this year, the Supreme Court overruled the
Enelow-Ettelson doctrine. I believe the Court was unquestionably right, and
that its opinion is similar to the evolutive approach urged in this article.
The Court's opinion in Gulfstream Aerospace avoids the formalisms and
anomalies of the opinions in Johnson and Square D. The Court's opinion is
remarkable in that it refuses to mention the super-strong presumption
against overruling statutory precedents, or even the legislative acquiescence
argument. Nor does the Court invoke any of the exceptions to the super-
strong presumption. Its reason for overruling the doctrine is distinctly evolu-
tive: "A half century's experience has persuaded us, as it has persuaded an
impressive array of judges and commentators, that the rule is unsound in
theory, unworkable and arbitrary in practice, and unnecessary to achieve any
legitimate goals. ' '3°°
The Court started with the "artificial" reasoning underlying the Enelow-
Ettelson doctrine.301 Even when federal judges followed different rules for
law cases and equity cases, the judge's stay of the legal issues required only
issuance of an order by the judge in charge of all issues in the case; to call
such an order an "injunction" simply because it would have been an injunc-
tion in a system with different judges handling law and equity is a fiction
established by Enelow. To perpetuate that fiction after the merger of law and
equity in 1938, as Ettelson did, is to wander into "Alice's Wonderland. '30 2
Thus, the doctrine itself is not well grounded in logic.
The Court's analysis continued. "The artificiality of the Enelow-Ettelson
doctrine is not merely an intellectual infelicity; the gulf between the historical
procedures underlying the rule and the modem procedures of federal courts
renders the rule helplessly unworkable in operation" and leads to "arbitrary
and anomolous results. ' 303 For example, many complaints contain a conge-
ries of allegations-some legal, some equitable, some hard to categorize.
Was the complaint predominantly legal, in which case the doctrine applied?
Or predominantly equitable, in which case it did not? In these and other
cases, courts of appeals became mired in semantic distinctions, and the com-
plex process of categorization yielded an ever-deepening scholasticism.
Finally, the Supreme Court agreed with the chorus of judges and commen-
298. Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1986); see Matter-
horn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 870-71 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial balloon criticizing the doctrine
by Judge Posner).
299. 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1138-43 (1988).
300. Id at 1140.
301. Id
302. Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563, 565 (2d Cir. 1942) (Clark, J.),
quoted in Gulfstream Aerospace, 108 S. Ct. at 1140.
303. Gulfstream Aerospace, 108 S. Ct. at 1140-41.
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tators who complained that the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine was not only fic-
tive, hard to apply, and arbitrary, but also "divorced from any rational or
coherent appeals policy.'' 3°4 The doctrine was a glaring exception to the gen-
eral final order rule, which the Court has tended to police carefully in recent
years.305 Most important, whatever "escape hatch" purpose the doctrine
served can be served by other, well-based exceptions to the finality rule. One
such exception, added by Congress in 1958, permits review of interlocutory
orders when there is "substantial ground for difference of opinion" and when
"an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation. '30 6
What is notably absent from the Supreme Court's opinion is any discus-
sion of the various legislative inaction arguments, which are just as applica-
ble to this case as to any number of others.307 In contrast, when the Supreme
Court had criticized the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine in 1955 as complicated and
arbitrary, the Court did not overrule the doctrine, since "the distinction has
been applied for years... and we conclude that it is better judicial practice to
follow the precedents which limit appealability of interlocutory orders, leav-
ing Congress to make such amendments as it may find proper. 308 After
1955, Congress has indeed focused on appealability issues. The 1958 statute,
for example, amended another subsection of the current version of the statute
that Enelow and Ettelson interpreted. And, in 1986, H.R. 4975 was intro-
duced in the Ninety-Ninth Congress to overrule the Enelow-Ettelson doc-
trine.309 Hence, Congress was in some way aware of the problem, and the
Court could have argued some degree of mild congressional acquiescence,
pursuant to earlier decisions.
Obviously, based upon the discussion in part II, I am skeptical of legisla-
tive acquiescence arguments and would urge the Court to deemphasize those
arguments in general. Note that such arguments may have less force in con-
nection with appellate procedure statutes. These are common law statutes-
generally worded, implicit delegations to the Court to fill in the details-and
Congress rarely bestirs itself to amend them. Indeed, the Court has been ac-
304. Lee v. Ply Gem Indus., 593 F.2d 1266, 1269 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979),
quoted in Gulfstream Aerospace, 108 S. Ct. at 1141.
305. Judge Posner pointed out in Olson that the appellate caseload has increased' tenfold since
1942, while the number of appellate federal judges has only increased threefold. Olson, 806 F.2d at
740.
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). Judge Posner cogently argued in Olson that Congress' action in
adding § 1292(b) was evidence of legislative non-acquiescence in the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine. Ol-
son, 806 F.2d at 738.
307. I believe the Court ignored the issue, in part because it was so determined to overrule
Enelow and Ettelson, but also in part because none of the parties had requested the Court to over-
rule these cases and, hence, had not briefed the issue.
308. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1955).
309. The bill was not reported out of committee.
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tive in developing the details of appellate jurisdictional rules, and the experi-
ence of Enelow and Ettelson is that waiting for Congress to overrule
jurisdictional cases in like waiting for Godot. The legislative agenda is very
crowded, and matters of appellate procedure do not occupy a high place on
that agenda, because Congress expects the Court to take care of that. It
stands separation of powers on its head to argue that Congress should correct
the Court's own mistake-especially when the mistake is so clear and the
matter so much more within the arena of expertise practically left to the
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
I hope that Gulfstream Aerospace will signal a shift away from the Court's
frequent invocation of a special stare decisis rule for statutory precedents
(Square D) and of the legislative acquiescence rule (Johnson). It is likely that
the Court will continue to grapple with these issues, however. Indeed,
shortly after Gulfstream Aerospace, the Court requested briefs on the ques-
tion of whether its statutory civil rights precedent, Runyon v. McCrary,310
should be overruled.311 Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan
dissented from the reargument as inconsistent with "the accepted doctrine of
stare decisis.' ' 312 Specifically, the dissenting Justices argued that Runyon's
interpretation of section 1981 to prohibit private acts of racial discrimination
in contract matters was entitled to particularly strong stare decisis effect.
Runyon itself had relied heavily upon an earlier statutory precedent, 313 based
in part on legislative refusal to overrule that precedent. 314 The dissenters
broadly relied on the precept that "'considerations of stare decisis weigh
heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to
change this Court's interpretation of its legislation.' ",315 Five Justices re-
jected this argument, observing that "we have explicitly overruled statutory
precedents in a host of cases." '316
Similar arguments could have been made in Gulfstream Aerospace, which
overruled Enelow and Ettelson notwithstanding legislative acquiescence and
310. 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of private contracts).
311. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 56 U.S.L.W. 3735 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1988) (No. 87-107)
(per curiam order requesting new briefs).
312. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A separate dissent, written by Justice Stevens, relied on
other arguments. All four Justices joined both dissents.
313. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
314. Runyon, 470 U.S. at 174-75 & n.11; see id at 186-87 (Powell, J. concurring); id at 189-92
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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failure to ehact a bill overruling those cases. These sorts of arguments should
not be the focus of the Court's deliberation. For the reasons rehearsed in this
article, the Court should be chary of invoking "special" stare decisis treat-
ment of statutory precedents. The super-strong presumption against overrul-
ing statutory precedents has never been thoroughly examined by the Court,
and its rhetoric ought to be abandoned. In its place, the Court ought to focus
on traditional stare decisis concerns-errors in the precedent's premises or
reasoning, the practical operation of the precedent, the fit between the prece-
dent and current statutory and constitutional policy, private and public reli-
ance. In reconsidering Runyon, the Court ought to focus on these concerns.
For many of the same reasons that I believe the Court was correct in not
overruling Weber, including "our society's commitment to ending racial dis-
crimination, ' ' 317 I believe there is much to be said for not overruling Runyon,
based upon traditional stare decisis principles. After all, the best lesson of
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Burnet is that the Court will depart from the
traditional rule of stare decisis only when necessary "to bring its opinions
into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained. ' '318
317. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
318. Burnet, 285 U.S. at 412, quoted in Patterson, 56 U.S.L.W. at 3735 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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APPENDIX A
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS EXPLICITLY OVERRULING
STATUTORY PRECEDENTS: 1961-1987
1427
Decision (Vote on Overruling) Precedent(s) Overruled Reason(s) for Overruling
Welch v. State Dep't of
Highways & Public Transp.,
107 S. Ct. 2941, 2947-48
(1987) (5-4 on Parden issue).
Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107
S. Ct. 2802, 2809-10 (1987)
(9-0 on statutory issue).
Brown v. Hotel Employees
Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S.
491, 504-05, 509-10 (1984) (4-
3).
Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (5-3).
United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms,
465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)
(9-0).
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 611
(1983) (Powell, J., with
Burger, C.J & Rehnquist, J.);
id at 612-13 (O'Connor, J.);
id. at 640-41 (Stevens,
Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.); see
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 352
(1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184 (1964).
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107
(1861).
Hill v. Florida ex rel Watson,
325 U.S. 538, 541 (1945).
United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227-28
(1947) (statement); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211, 215 (1951)
(holding), and other cases.
Coffey v. United States, 116
U.S. 436, 442-45 (1986).
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563,
568 (1974).
Procedural reasons (cases and
analogies cited in Parden do











alternative holdings based on
uncritical acceptance of
illogical doctrine). [Common











Trammel v. United States, 445 Hawkins v. United States, 358
U.S. 40, 51-53 (1980) (9-0). U.S. 74 (1958).
Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
663 (1978) (7-2).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
187 (1961).






[Common law statute, with
constitutional underpinnings
(section 1983).]
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Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58
(1977) (5-3).
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.
99, 105-07 (1977) (6-0 on
partial overruling of statutory
precedents).
Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 154
(1976) (6-3).
Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484,
499-500 (1973) (5-3-1).
Andrews v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320,
326 (1972) (7-1).
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 92-96, 101-02 (1971)
(9-0).
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971) (9-0).
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 238, 249-50, 254-55
(1970) (6-2).
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 671 (1969) (9-0).
United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365,
375 (1967).
Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971); Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 141 (1967); Rusk v.
Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 372
(1962).
UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations
Comm'n, 336 U.S. 245, 265
(1949).
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S.
188, 193 (1948).
Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
312 U.S. 630, 633 (1941).
Collins v. Hardyman, 341
U.S. 651, 662 (1951).
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S.
638, 642 (1936).
Sinclair Refilning Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203
(1965).
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339


























law statute, with constitutional
underpinnings (section 1985).]
Erosion of original rationale.
Subsequent judicial and
statutory developments.
Sinclair was an aberration.
Subsequent judicial
developments, Policy reasons.
[Common law statute (section
301).]
Hazeltine was an aberration.
Bad policy consequences.
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Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54,
67 (1968) (9-0).
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234, 240 (1968) (8-0).
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519, 526-27 (1966) (9-0).
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382
U.S. 111, 124 (1965) (6-3).
Harris v. United States, 382
U.S. 162, 167 (1965) (5-4).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
435-36 (1963) (6-3).
Local 438, Constr. & Gen.
Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371
U.S. 542, 552 (1963) (8-1).
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
371 U.S. 195, 199 (1962) (8-
1); see UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,
700 (1966) (6-3).
James v. United States, 366
U.S. 213, 222 (1961) (6-3 on
Wilcox issue).
McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131,
138-39 (1934).
Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574,
576 (1960) (per curiam).
Postum Cereal Co. v.
California Fig Nut Co., 272
U.S. 693 (1927).
Kesler v. Department of
Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153,
157 (1962).
Brown v. United States, 359
U.S. 41, 51-52 (1959).
Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200, 208 (1950).
Montgomery Bldg. Trades
Council v. Ledbetter Erection
Co., 344 U.S. 178, 181 (1952).
Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.S.
437, 459 (1955).
Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327
U.S. 404, 409 (1946).
Procedural reasons (erroneous
















(departure from prior cases).
Critical commentary and
practical experience.




















judicial and statutory rules.
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APPENDIX B
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IMPLICITLY OVERRULING
STATUTORY PRECEDENTS: 1961-1987
This appendix lists decisions which have the effect of overruling the hold-
ing (or part of the holding) of a statutory precedent, but in which the Court
does not actually state that it is overruling the precedent. Cases are chosen
for this appendix only when there is evidence within the Court's opinion,
and/or concurring or dissenting opinions, for the proposition that the prece-
dent is overruled, and when subsequent citations of the "overruled" prece-
dent support the categorization. (This appendix also cites evidence that a
precedent has effectively been overruled and the Court's vote-those in favor
of curtailing the precedent, those opposed, and, in some instances, those tak-
ing no position on that issue.)
Precedent(s) Implicitly Evidence of Implicit
Decision (Vote on Overruling) Overruled Overruling
United States v. Lane, 474
U.S. 438 (1986) (7-2).
American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Dallas County, 463 U.S.
855 (1983) (6-2).
American Soc'y of Mechanical
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (5-
3-1).
McElroy v. United States, 164
U.S. 76, 81 (1896).
Society for Savings v. Bowers,
349 U.S. 143, 148 (1955);
Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Lander, 184 U.S. 111, 113-15
(1902); Van Allen v.
Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
573, 582 (1866).
Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW,
268 U.S. 295, 304 (1925);
UMW v. Coronado Coal Co.,
259 U.S. 344, 395 (1922).
Court explains away McElroy
based on subsequent statutory
developments, 474 U.S. at 44-
46. Dissent defends McElroy
and argues that it not be
overruled. Id at 466-75
(Stevens, J., dissenting in
part).
Court criticizes "dicta" and
ambiguities in these pre-1959
cases, 463 U.S. at 871-72 &
n.14, and considers them
overriden by congressional
action. Id. at 858, 862.
Dissent objects that Court is
evading clear holdings of these
precedents. Id. at 873-79
(Rehnquist, J.).
Court unpersuasively tries to
distinguish Coronado cases,
456 U.S. at 573 n.12, which
dissent shows to be on point.
Id. at 581-82 & n.5 (Powell,
J.).
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Montana v. United States, 450 Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,
U.S. 544 (1981) (6-3); see 397 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1970).
Utah Div. of State Lands v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2318
(1987).
Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979)
(2-0-6).
Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)
(8-0-1).
California v. United States,
438 U.S. 645 (1978) (6-3).
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976) (6-3).
Barrett v. United States, 423
U.S. 212 (1976) (6-2).
United States v. Perryman,
100 U.S. 235, 236 (1880).
Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours Powder
Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918);
Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912), and other cases.
Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 586-87 (1963); City
of Fresno v. California, 372
U.S. 627, 629-30 (1963);
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 291
(1958).
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420
U.S. 283, 291-92 & nn.8-9
(1975), and several earlier
cases.
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463, 466 (1943).
Court distinguishes Choctaw,
450 U.S. at 555-56 n.5; id at
569 (Stevens, J., concurring),
but dissent demonstrates there
is no principled way to
distinguish it. Ia at 573-77
(Blackmun, J.). Subsequently,
Court has limited Choctaw to
its "very peculiar
circumstances." 107 S. Ct. at
2321.
Court distinguishes precedent,
442 U.S. at 666 n.16, but
earier decision cannot logically
survive and is probably an
unconstitutional statutory
interpretation. Id at 680-81
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
Court expands Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971), to reject
mutuality requirement
generally in federal cases. 439
U.S. at 326-28 & n.6.
Court only admits to
"disavowing" dicta/reasoning
of precedents, 438 U.S. at
670-75, but dissent shows
Court is eviscerating
precedents. Id at 690-95
(White, J.).
Dissent discusses precedents
that do not survive Court's
interpretation of habeas
statute. 428 U.S. at 518-19 &
n.14 (Brernan, J.).
Court declines to follow Tot
"statement," 423 U.S. at 221-
22, notwithstanding dissent's
argument that this was
"essential to [Tot's] holding"
and was accepted by
Congress. Id at 229-31
(Stewart, J.).
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Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151
(1975) (7-2); see Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
(1968) (5-1).
Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87 (1974) (5-4).
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528 (1974) (6-3).
United States v. Chicago, B.
& Q.R.R., 412 U.S. 401
(1973) (6-2).
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251 (1972) (5-2).
Amalgamated Ass'n of St.
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274 (1971) (5-4).
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty
Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day,
370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962)
(Harlan, J.).
Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Chicago, R.I. &
P.R.R., 382 U.S. 423, 428
(1966); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 84-85
(1960).
Brown Shoe Co. v.
Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583
(1950).
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
324 U.S. 439, 447 & 451
(1945).
International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356
U.S. 617, 621 (1958).
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
392 U.S. 409 (1968) (7-2). 323, 331 (1926); see Hurd v.
Hedge, 334 U.S. 24, 31
(1948).
Court narrows Jewell to facts,
422 U.S. at 160-61, effectively
overruling it. Id. at 166-67
(Blackmun, J., concurring in
the result); see id. at 168-70
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); 392
U.S. at 407-08 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting in Fortnightly).
Court more or less ignores
Manual, 418 U.S. at 104, but
dissent argues implicit
overruling. Id. at 142
(Brennan, J.).
Court recognizes that its
decision is "at odds" with
prior decisions. 415 U.S. at
543-45; see id. at 533-35 n.5
(rejecting jurisdictional
approaches taken in other
precedents).
Court seeks to distinguish
Brown Shoe, 412 U.S. at 411-
13, but not persuasively. Id
at 417 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). At any rate,
Brown Shoe has been
legislatively overruled for
cases after 1954. Id. at 426 &
n.10 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Court treats parens patriae
issue as "open," 405 U.S. at
260, contrary to precedent; see
i d at 268-70 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id at 271-73
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Court questions reasoning of
Gonzalez in light of prevailing
Garmon test but distinguishes
Gonzalez on facts. 403 U.S. at
293-97. Dissents argue this is
implicit overruling. Id at
302-03, 308 (Douglas, J.); id.
at 309 & 319 n.3 (White, J.).
Court argues that Corrigan
was not a "considered"
opinion, and Hurd was just
repeating Corrigan as dictum.
392 U.S. at 419 & 420 n.25.
Dissent demonstrates
relevance of both precedents.
Id. at 451-52 & n.8 (Harlan,
J.).
1432
HeinOnline  -- 76 Geo. L. J. 1432 1987-1988
OVERRULING STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967) (5-2).
Sansone v. United States, 380
U.S. 343 (1965) (9-0 on the
issue of implicitly overruling
statutory precedent).
Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
377 U.S. 13 (1964) (5-3).
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476 (1964) (5-4).
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
370 U.S. 114 (1962) (6-2).
Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438 (1962) (5-2).
Killian v. United States, 368
U.S. 231 (1961) (5-4).
White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963).
Achilli v. United States, 353
U.S. 373, 379 (1957).
United States v. General Elec.
Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926).
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 365
U.S. 336, 342, 345 (1961).
Hahn v. Ross Island Sand &
Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 272
(1959) (per curiam); see Davis
v. Department of Labor &
Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 255-56
(1942).
Farley v. United States, 354
U.S. 521, 523 (1957); see
Johnson v. United States, 352
U.S. 565, 566 (1957).
American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
407-08 (1950).
Court adopts a per se rule
apparently inconsistent with
White Motor, but without
explicitly overruling the




"overrule[s]" it. Id at 388-89
(Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Court notes that the reasoning
of Achilli has been undercut
by statutory changes, 380 U.S.
at 348-49, and then ignores
Achilli's holding.
Court narrows G.E. to its
facts, 377 U.S. at 22-24, but
dissent shows G.E. to be
"virtually indistinguishable"
from this case, ia at 26-27 &
n.1 (Stewart, J.,), and
considers it "overrule[d]." Id
at 29; see iL at 31-32
(Brennan & Goldberg, JJ.,
memorandum).
Court distinguishes Aro I, 377
U.S. at 479-81 & n.1, but
dissenting Justices argue that
new result came from shift in
Court personnel, see id at
517-22 (Black, J.).
Dissent argues Hahn and
many other cases are being
effectively overruled. 370 U.S.
at 136-38 (Stewart, J.). No
subsequent Supreme Court
citation or reliance on Hahn.
Dissent argues Farley is being
overruled "sub silentio." 369




Douds' statutory holding, but




U.S. at 260 (Black, J.); id at
262-63 (Douglas, J.); id. at
267-72 (Brennan, J.).
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Still v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 368 Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. Court limits Rock "to its
U.S. 35 (1961) (7-1-1). M. Ry. y. Rock, 279 U.S. 410, precise facts," 368 U.S. at 44,
414-15 (1929). "gratuitously and
erroneously" according to the
dissent. Id. at 48 (Whittaker,
J.).
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APPENDIX C
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DISAVOWING SIGNIFICANT
REASONING IN STATUTORY PRECEDENTS: 1961-1987
This appendix lists decisions in which the Court has explicitly or in a few
cases implicitly disavowed "significant reasoning" in a statutory precedent.
Cases are chosen for this appendix only when the disapproved reasoning is
important or prominent in the decision, even if it is technically dictum. (This
appendix also cites evidence that significant reasoning in a precedent has
been rejected and the Court's vote-those in favor of rejecting the earlier
statement, those opposed, and, in some instances, those taking no position on
that issue.)
Decision (Vote on Overruling)
Crawford Fitting Co. v. LT.
Gibbons, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2494
(1987) (7-2).
Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct.
2333 (1987) (54).
NLRB v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, Local 340,
107 S. Ct. 2002 (1987) (5-3-1).
North Carolina Dep't of
Transp. v. Crest St.
Community Council, Inc., 107
S. Ct. 336 (1986) (6-3).
United States v. National




Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964).
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
438 (1953).
ABC v. Writers Guild, 437
U.S. 411, 436 (1978).
New York Gaslight Club, Inc.
v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 65-66
& n.6 (1980).
United States v. Rodgers, 461




"classic obiter" in Fanner, 107
S. Ct. at 2498. Dissent argues
that the "obiter" is a
fundamental premise. Id at
2500-01 (Marshall, J.).
Court disavows Wilko
reasoning but claims to be
faithful to stare decisis. 107 S.
Ct. at 2340-41. Dissents rely
on stare decisis, id at 2359
(Stevens, J.); id at 2346-49
(Brennan, J.), and claim that
Court "effectively overrules"
Wilko. id at 2346.
Court disapproves "dictum"
in ABC. 107 S. Ct. at 2013
n.15. Dissent argues that
disapproved language is part
of ABC holding. Id. at 2018
(White, J.).
Court rejects "dicta" in Carey
and curtails its reasoning. 107
S. Ct. at 341. Dissent argues
that Carey language has been
treated as authoritative and
that Carey cannot be
distinguished. Id at 344-45.
(Brennan, J.).
Rodgers is distinguished by
Court, 472 U.S. at 731-32 &
n.15, and relied on extensively
by dissent. Id at 740-41 &
n.6 (Powell, .).
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Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821 (1985) (8-1 on Bachowski
issue).
Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985) (7-
2).
Local 82, Furniture & Piano
Moving Drivers v. Crowley,
467 U.S. 526 (1984) (8-1).
South Carolina v. Regan, 465
U.S. 367 (1984) (5-3-1 on the
Bob Jones issue).
Bowen v. United States Postal
Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983) (5-
4).
Zipes v. TWA, Inc., 455 U.S.
385 (1982) (8-0).
NLRB v. Hendricks County
Rural Elec. Membership
Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) (5-
4).
McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452
U.S. 130 (1981) (7-2).
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560, 568-76 (1975).
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 597-98 (1976).
Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S.
528, 531 (1972); Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566-
67 (1976).
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon,
416 U.S. 725, 732 n.6 (1974).
International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S.
42, 50 n.13 (1979); ia at 57
(Blackmun, J., concurring);
see Czosek v. O'Mara, 397
U.S. 25, 29 (1970).
International Union of Elec.
Workers Local 790 v. Robbins
& Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229,
240 (1976), and other
precedents.
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267, 284 n.12 (1974).
East Carroll Parish School
Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636,
638-39 n.6 (1976) (per
curiam).
Court seeks to reinterpret
Bachowski reasoning that
administrative inaction is
subject to presumption of




U.S. at 57 n.21, but also
seems hostile to Cantor
reasoning. Id. at 56-58; see id
at 71-74 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Acknowledgement by Court
that earlier statements are
disapproved, 467 U.S. at 549-
50 & n.22, and criticism by
dissent. Id at 559 n.8
(Stevens, J.).
Acknowledgement by Court
that it is narrowing Bob Jones,
465 U.S. at 377 n.14, and
criticism by concurrence. Id
at 385-87 (O'Connor, J.).
Court narrows Czosek and
Foust. 459 U.S. at 228-30.
Concurrence relies on Foust
dictum. Id. at 235-36 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part).
Court admits that previous
cases had contrary dicta, 455
U.S. at 392-93 n.6 (citing
cases), but argues that trend
of dicta is in accord with
holding in Zipes. Id at 395-
97.
Court explicitly rejects earlier
"dictum," 454 U.S. at 186-88,
though dissent argues that
Bell Aerospace "principle" is
correct. Id. at 192-97 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Court disavows prior dictum,
452 U.S. at 141 & n.19,
though dissent argues that the
dictum "represented the
deliberate and considered view
of the Court." Id at 154
(Stewart, J.).
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Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l
Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981) (5-
4).
City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (6-
1-2 on Sheffield issue).
United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979) (5-2).
Confederated Moe v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
463, 470 (1976), and previous
cases.
United States v. Board of
Comm'rs of Sheffield, Ala.,
435 U.S. 110, 128-29 & n.17
(1978).
Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579
(1978); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
U.S. 330 (1979) (8-0). 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978) (6-3).
City of Lafayette, La. v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389 (1978) (5-4 on
Parker issue).
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977) (6-3); see Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536
(1976) (6-1).
San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 245 (1959).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 352 (1943).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
438 (1963).
Court rejects suggestions in
Moe and previous cases, 450
U.S. at 525, and dissent relies
on statements in prior
precedents. Id. at 530-31
(Stevens, J.).
Court distinguishes Sheffield,
446 U.S. at 168-69, but
concurrence emphasizes that
part of its reasoning must fail.
Id, at 191-92 & n.4 (Stevens,
J.); see id at 194, 196-200
(Powell, J., dissenting).
Court implicitly rejects prior
dicta. See 443 U.S. at 220-21
& n. 1 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Court restricts language/
reasoning in Hawaii. 442 U.S.
at 336, 341-42.
Court refuses to follow
Garmon preemption test and
creates a new one. 436 U.S.
at 187-89 & n.13; see id at
208 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Dissent claims
violation of stare decisis. Idr
at 215-17 (Brennan, J.).
Court admits to narrowing
Parker to exclude
municipalities from its
protection in some instances,
435 U.S. at 408-13 (plurality
opinion), and dissent argues
that holding cuts against
reasoning of Parker. Id at
426 (Stewart, J.).
Court declines to overrule Fay
but "reject[s]" Fay's
"sweeping language" and its
waiver standard "set forth in
dicta." 433 U.S. at 87-88; see
id at 94-96 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Dissent argues
Fay's applicability. Idr at 102-
09 (Brennan, J.); see also id.
at 98-99 (White, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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Third Nat'l Bank v. Impac,
Ltd., 432 U.S. 312 (1977) (6-
3).
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976) (6-3).
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579 (1976) (5-4).
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976) (7-2).
United States v. United
Continental Tuna Corp., 425
U.S. 164 (1976) (7-1).
Barrett v. United States, 423
U.S. 212 (1976) (6-2).
Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619
(1975) (6-2).
Warden, Lewisburg
Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417
U.S. 653 (1974) (6-3).
Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Mixter,
124 U.S. 721, 727 (1888).
Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1969).
Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 350-51 (1943).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883), and
subsequent cases.
Amell v. United States, 384
U.S. 158, 164 (1966).
United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 342-43 (1971).
INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214,
217 (1966).
Bradley v. United States, 410
U.S. 605, 611 n.6 (1973); see
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480 (1972).
Court admits to overruling
"dictum," 432 U.S. at 319 n.9,
though dissent argues that
dictum has been treated as
authoritative. Id. at 328-31
(Blackmun, J.).
Court "rejects" dictum in
Kaufman, 428 U.S. at 481-82
n.16, and dissent accuses
Court of implicitly overruling
Kaufman. Id. at 519 n.14
(Brennan, J.).
Plurality opinion narrows
Parker to lawsuits against
state actors. 428 U.S. at 585-
92, 600-03 (opinion of Stevens,
J.); see id. at 609-14 & n.5
(Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment). Dissent
accuses the plurality of
"trivializ[ing] that case to the
point of overruling it." Id. at
616 (Stewart, J.); see id. at
615-17, 622-25.
Court implicitly rejects "clear
dictum" in Civil Rights Cases.
See 427 U.S. at 192-95
(White, J., dissenting).
Court rejects Amell "dictum,"
425 U.S. at 178 n.16, but
dissent argues Amell reasoning
is both correct and necessary
to holding. Id. at 182-84
(Stewart, J.).
Court "rejects" Bass dictum.
423 U.S. at 222-23. Dissent
relies on "settled
interpretation" reflected in
Bass. Id. at 231 (Stewart, J.).
Court distinguishes Errico,
420 U.S. at 630, over dissent's
objection that its reasoning
applies to this case. Id. at
631-33 (Brennan, J.).
Court acknowledges footnote
six of Bradley but treats it as
dictum, 417 U.S. 657, 658-59,
and "renders the words of the
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OVERRULING STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (4-
3).
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
United Transp. Union, 402
U.S. 570 (1971) (5-0 on
Missouri-Kan.-Te. issue).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) (5-1-3).
In re Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968) (7-1).
United States v. Neifert-White
Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968) (8-
0).
United Mine Workers v.




Union v. Union Pac. R.R.,
385 U.S. 157 (1966) (7-2).
Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393,
403 (1935).
General Comm. v. Missouri-
Kan.-Tex. R.R., 320 U.S. 323,
334 (1943).
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503, 517 (1944). Possibly
also FPC v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602,
616 (1944).
United States v. Cohn, 270
U.S. 339, 345-46 (1926).
Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S.
238, 245-46 (1933).
Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 349 U.S. 366, 372-73
(1955).
Dissent argues Hill rule, 405
U.S. at 558-59 (White, J.), but
Court distinguishes this case.
Id. at 555-56.
Court disavows "passing
reference" to statute in
Missouri-Kan.-Tex RR., 402
U.S. at 577-78.
Court disapproves of broad
statements in Dombrowski.
401 U.S. at 50-53.
Court disagrees with
"imprecise" dictum in Bowles,
390 U.S. at 775, but
distinguishes Hope. Id
Dissent sees Court's decision
as irreconcilable with Hope.
Id at 829-31 (Douglas, J.).
Court rejects Cohn dictum.
390 U.S. at 231 & n.4.
Court reformulates test for
pendent federal jurisdiction,
rejecting test formulated in
Hum. 383 U.S. at 722-25.
Court says it is only cutting
back "dicta" in Whitehouse,
385 U.S. at 164, but dissent
argues this essentially
repudiates the Whitehouse
reasoning. Id at 179-80
(Fortas, J.).
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